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Abstract
We consider the temporal language with the Priorean operators G andH expressing that a formula is true at all future times and
all past times, plus an operator expressing that a formula is true throughout some open interval containing the evaluation time
(i.e. it is true ‘around now’).We show that the logic of time based on the real numbers in this language is ﬁnitely axiomatizable,
answering an implicit question of Shehtman (1993). We also show that the logic has PSPACE-complete complexity, but is
not Kripke complete and has no strongly complete axiomatization.
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1 Introduction
Modal formulas can be given semantics in models based on topological spaces. In a topological
model, the formula ϕ is true at a point if ϕ is true throughout some open neighbourhood of that
point. So the set of points satisfying ϕ is the interior of the set of points satisfying ϕ. Topological
semantics predates Kripke semantics and was ﬁrst considered by McKinsey and Tarski [20], who
proved that the logic of any separable dense-in-itself metric space, such as the rationals (Q) and reals
(R) with the usual metric, is S4. Interest in this theorem is undergoing a renaissance and several new
proofs have recently appeared [1, 2, 10, 17, 21, 22], either for R alone or for the general case. The
assumption of separability was removed in [24]. The theorem was extended by Kremer [12, 13] to a
strong completeness result for any dense-in-itself metric space (for countable languages).
Additional connectives have also been considered. Shehtman added the universal modality ∀: a
formula ∀ϕ is true at an arbitrary point of a topological model if ϕ is true at every point. He showed in
[29] that the logic of any connected separable dense-in-itself metric space, such as R, is S4UC, with
S4 axioms for, the usual axioms U for ∀, and a connectedness axiom C: ∀(p∨¬p)→∀p∨∀¬p.
Kudinov added the difference operator [=]: a formula [=]ϕ is true at a point if ϕ is true at
every other point. The difference operator is more expressive than ∀. In the language with ,[=],
Kudinov axiomatized the logic of all topological spaces, all dense-in-themselves topological spaces,
and any zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metric space [14]. He also axiomatized the logic of Rn for
n≥2 (unpublished), but proved [15] that the logic of R is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable, and not even
axiomatizable by formulas using ﬁnitely many variables in total.
In [28], Shehtman shifted attention to temporal logic by adding the Priorean temporal connectives
G and H to the original . This language is given semantics in ordered topological models. An
ordered topological model is a topological model whose topology is the interval topology arising
from an irreﬂexive linear order < on the set of points. Examples include models based on Q and R
with their usual orderings and topologies. Such models can be viewed temporally. We can regard the
points as times and the order < as the earlier–later relation, so that x<y denotes that x is in the past
of y and y in the future of x. A formula Gϕ is true at a point or time x in such a model iff ϕ is true at
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1072 Priorean temporal logic
all future times—all y satisfying x<y. A formula Hϕ is true at x if ϕ is true at all past times y<x.
Together, the connectives G,H are even more expressive than [=]. In the temporal context, ϕ can
still be read topologically, but it also has a reasonable temporal reading as ‘ϕ is true around now’, and
this view was promulgated by Scott. In [28], Shehtman gave a ﬁnite axiomatization of the logic of Q
in this language, observed that the logic of R in the same language is decidable and hence recursively
axiomatizable, and implicitly posed [28, p.256] the problem of axiomatizing it explicitly. Although
the area of topological semantics of modal logic has recently attracted a good deal of attention, this
problem has remained open.
Although it has no topological -modality, the very expressive temporal language with U and S
(Until and Since) is worth mentioning here. A formula U(ϕ,ψ) is true at a time point x if there is a
point y>x at which ϕ is true and such that ψ is true at every z with x<z<y — informally, ψ is true
until ϕ becomes true. The meaning of S is obtained by swapping < with >. The connectives U and
S were introduced by Kamp [11] and they can easily express all the connectives we have considered
so far. Indeed, over R, they can express every connective whose meaning is deﬁnable in ﬁrst-order
logic [11]. Reynolds gave a ﬁnite axiomatization of the logic of R with U,S in [25], and showed the
logic to be PSPACE-complete in [26].
In the current study we consider Shehtman’s temporal language with G, H and , interpreted
over R. We answer Shehtman’s implicit question [28] by showing that the logic of R in this language
is ﬁnitely axiomatizable. Given Kudinov’s result, this is perhaps surprising, but given Reynolds’s, it
is less so. It suggests that G, H, and are in some sense closer to Until and Since over R than to [=]
and . We obtain only ‘weak completeness’, and we show that no strong completeness result can be
proven. We also show that the logic is not Kripke compete. As we said, Shehtman observed in [28]
that it is decidable, and we show here that it is PSPACE-complete.
Our axiom system is similar to the one for Q given by Shehtman in [28]—the only difference
is that we include an additional connectedness axiom F(p∧Fq)∧F(¬p∧Fq)→F(p∧¬p∧Fq),
where Fϕ abbreviates ¬G¬ϕ. Our completeness proof starts in the same way as well, by a certain
ﬁltration of the canonical model. We then apply selective ﬁltration and a closure technique designed
to give a well behaved ﬁnite Kripke model, which we employ as a template to construct a model
over R, using lexicographic sums.
Layout of paper: Section 2 contains the basic deﬁnitions, and Section 3 the system of axioms and
inference rules for the logic of R in the language withG,H and. In Section 4 we prove that the logic
has no strong axiomatization and is not Kripke complete, but is (decidable and) PSPACE-complete
(decidability was known to Shehtman). Section 5 outlines the coming completeness proof. Section 6
builds the well-behaved ﬁnite Kripke model referred to above, and Section 7 constructs from it a
model over R. We conclude in Section 8 with some open problems.
Throughout, we use N,Z,Q,R to denote the ordered sets of natural numbers, integers, rationals
and real numbers (respectively).
2 Generalities
Here, we lay down the syntax and semantics of our logic, and deﬁne some basic terms.
2.1 Syntax
Let PV be a ﬁxed countably inﬁnite set of propositional atoms. We write p,q,r,... for atoms. We
deﬁne the language L to consist of the following formulas:
(1)  is a formula.
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Priorean temporal logic 1073
(2) Every p∈PV is a formula.
(3) If ϕ,ψ are formulas then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ∧ψ , Gϕ, Hϕ, and ϕ.
The mirror image of a formula ϕ is the formula obtained by replacing every G in ϕ by H , and
every H in ϕ by G. As abbreviations we let ⊥=¬, ϕ∨ψ=¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ), ϕ→ψ=¬(ϕ∧¬ψ),
ϕ↔ψ= (ϕ→ψ)∧(ψ→ϕ), Fϕ=¬G¬ϕ, Pϕ=¬H¬ϕ, and ϕ=¬¬ϕ.
2.2 Semantics over R
We deﬁne semantics forL-formulas over R as follows. Let h :PV →℘(R) be an assignment to atoms
(where ℘ denotes power-set). The pair (R,h) is then called a model over R. For each x∈R and
formula ϕ we deﬁne (R,h),x |=ϕ by induction:
(1) (R,h),x |=,
(2) (R,h),x |=p iff x∈h(p), for p∈PV ,
(3) (R,h),x |=¬ϕ iff (R,h),x |=ϕ,
(4) (R,h),x |=ϕ∧ψ iff (R,h),x |=ϕ and (R,h),x |=ψ ,
(5) (R,h),x |=Gϕ iff (R,h),y |=ϕ for all y∈R with y>x,
(6) (R,h),x |=Hϕ iff (R,h),y |=ϕ for all y∈R with y<x, and
(7) (R,h),x |=ϕ iff there exist y,z∈R with y<x<z and (R,h),t |=ϕ for all t∈R with y< t<z.
A model (R,h) over R is said to satisfy a formula ϕ if there is some x∈R with (R,h),x |=ϕ. We
say that ϕ is satisﬁable over R if some model over R satisﬁes it, and ϕ is valid over R if ¬ϕ is not
satisﬁable over R. A set  of L-formulas is said to be satisﬁable over R if there exist an assignment
h :PV →℘(R) and x∈R with (R,h),x |=ϕ for every ϕ∈.
The L-logic of R is the set of all L-formulas that are valid over R.
2.3 Kripke semantics
Formulas have an alternative Kripke semantics. A binary relation on a set W is a subset R of W×W .
For w,u∈W , we may write any of Rwu, wRu, R(w,u) to indicate that (w,u)∈R.
A Kripke frame (for L) is a triple (W ,,R), where W is a non-empty set and ,R are binary
relations on W , associated with G,, respectively. Occasionally we consider frames of the form
(W ,R) as well.
The choice of the symbol  for the ‘temporal’ relation may be controversial, so we will spend a
little space justifying it.After all, in [28], Shehtman used the symbol S.We ﬁnd convenient because
it gives rise to readily understood symbols ,, for various derived relations, and also because
the temporal relations in the main proof will always be transitive, a property that is suggested by the
symbol. However, we stress at the outset that in spite of what the notation may suggest, will not
necessarily be irreﬂexive. That is, we may have ww for some elements w∈W. The reader needs
to guard against this possibly misleading aspect of the symbols , throughout. The symbol <
suggests irreﬂexivity even more strongly than , so we avoid it.
Given an assignment h :PV →℘(W ), the tuple M= (W ,,R,h) is called a Kripke model (for L).
For w∈W , we deﬁne M,w |=ϕ by induction on formulas ϕ:
(1) M,w |=,
(2) M,w |=p iff w∈h(p), for p∈PV ,
(3) M,w |=¬ϕ iff M,w |=ϕ,
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1074 Priorean temporal logic
(4) M,w |=ϕ∧ψ iff M,w |=ϕ and M,w |=ψ ,
(5) M,w |=Gϕ iff M,u |=ϕ for all u∈W with wu,
(6) M,w |=Hϕ iff M,u |=ϕ for all u∈W with uw, and
(7) M,w |=ϕ iff M,u |=ϕ for all u∈W with Rwu.
Let F= (W ,,R) be a Kripke frame, and M= (W ,,R,h) a Kripke model. We say that a formula
ϕ is satisﬁable (or satisﬁed) in M, and that M satisﬁes ϕ, if there is w∈W with M,w |=ϕ, and
satisﬁable in F if there are h :PV →℘(W ) and w∈W with (W ,,R,h),w |=ϕ. A formula ϕ is said
to be valid in F (respectively, M) if ¬ϕ is not satisﬁable in F (respectively, M).
2.4 General deﬁnitions
For a map f :X→Y , and X ′ ⊆X , we write f (X ′) for {f (x) :x∈X ′}. We write dom f for X and rng f
for f (X).
Deﬁnition 2.1
Let W be a set, and R a binary relation on it.
(1) For w,u∈W , we write any of Rwu, wRu, R(w,u) to indicate that (w,u)∈R.
(2) We let R• denote the binary relation on W deﬁned by R•wu iff Rwu∧¬Ruw.
(3) For w∈W we write R(w)={u∈W :Rwu}.
(4) A subset X⊆W is said to be R-generated if R(x)⊆X for every x∈X .
(5) For X⊆W , we write RX for the binary relation R∩(X×X) on X .
(6) We say that R is prelinear if for all x,y∈W we have Rxy∨x=y∨Ryx. (Note that more than
one disjunct may hold. The term connex is also used in the literature, but here R will usually
be transitive, in which case ‘prelinear’ seems more evocative.)
Deﬁnition 2.2
Let M= (W ,,R,h) be a Kripke model.
(1) Letu,w∈W .Wewritewu to abbreviatewu∨w=u, andwu to abbreviatewu∧uw.
We take uw as synonymous for wu, and similarly for .
(2) An element w∈W is said to be -reﬂexive if ww, and -irreﬂexive, otherwise.
(3) A-cluster of/in M is a ⊆-maximal non-empty subset C⊆W such that wu for all w,u∈C.
This usage of ‘cluster’ is slightly different from that in (e.g.) [28]. Plainly, every member of a
cluster is -reﬂexive.
(4) Let N = (W ′,′,R′,h′) be a Kripke model. We say that N is a submodel of M, and write
N ⊆M, if W ′ ⊆W , ′ =W ′, R′ =RW ′, and h′(p)=W ′ ∩h(p) for every atom p∈PV .
(5) Let N ⊆M be as above. We say that N is an R-generated submodel (of M) if W ′ is an
R-generated subset of W , a -generated submodel if W ′ is a -generated subset of W , and a
-generated submodel if W ′ is a -generated subset of W .
(6) We say that N is a generated submodel of M if it is an R-generated, a -generated, and a
-generated submodel of M.
Lemma 2.3
Let M,N be Kripke models as above, and suppose that N is a generated submodel of M.
(1) If  is transitive, then any -reﬂexive point w∈W lies in a unique -cluster, namely, {u∈W :
wu}.
(2) N ,w |=ϕ iff M,w |=ϕ for every L-formula ϕ and every w∈W ′.
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Priorean temporal logic 1075
(3) Every L-formula that is valid in the frame (W ,,R) of M is valid in the frame (W ′,′,R′)
of N .
Proof. We leave the proof of part 1 as an exercise. Part 2 is well known and easily proved by
induction on ϕ. Part 3 follows from part 2. 
2.5 Linear orders
A linear order is a structure (I,<), where I is a non-empty set and< is an irreﬂexive transitive binary
relation on I that is prelinear according to Deﬁnition 2.1(6): (I,<) |=∀xy(x<y∨x=y∨x>y). Since
< is irreﬂexive and transitive, exactly one disjunct holds, and we say in this case that < is linear.
See, e.g. [27] for information about linear orders. We often write (I,<) simply as I . As usual, we let
x≤y abbreviate x<y∨x=y. A subset U⊆ I is unbounded (in I) if for all x∈ I there are y,z∈U with
y<x<z. An interval of I is a non-empty convex subset of I . We will often regard an interval as a
linear order in its own right, under the ordering induced from I .We use standard notation for intervals
speciﬁable by endpoints: if x,y∈ I and x≤y then (x,y)={z∈ I :x<z<y}, [x,y)={z∈ I :x≤z<y},
[x,y]={z∈ I :x≤z≤y}, (−∞,x)={z∈ I :z<x}, [x,∞)={z∈ I :z≥x}, etc. An open interval is one
containing no least or greatest element.
3 Axioms
We now present a Hilbert system that, as we will show, axiomatises the L-logic of R. It is based
on a system of Shehtman [28, Section 2] that was shown to axiomatise the L-logic of Q. The only
difference is that we have added a ‘connectedness’ axiom, axiom 5.
3.1 The system
The axioms are as follows. We assume familiarity with Sahlqvist formulas in temporal logic: see,
e.g. [3]. The axioms 2–4 are Sahlqvist formulas and their ﬁrst-order correspondents are reproduced
below. (The normality axioms can be turned into Sahlqvist formulas by replacing q by ¬q ; their
correspondents are equivalent to , and are omitted.) Each correspondent is true in a Kripke frame
iff the axiom is valid in the frame. Moreover, the correspondents are true in the frame of the canonical
model of the logic axiomatized by the system.
(1) all propositional tautologies
(2) axioms for dense linear time without endpoints:
G(p→q)→ (Gp→Gq) normality
Gp→GGp transitivity: ∀xyz(xy∧yz→xz)
p→GPp ∀xy(xy→yx)
GGp→Gp density: ∀xy(xy→∃z(xz∧zy))
FPp→p∨Fp∨Pp ∀xyz(xy∧yz→x=z∨xz∨xz)
(3) S4 axioms for :
(p→q)→ (p→q) normality
p→p reﬂexivity: ∀xR(x,x)
p→p transitivity: ∀xyz(R(x,y)∧R(y,z)→R(x,z))
(4) Shehtman’s ‘special axioms’:
(a) Hp∧p∧Gp→p ∀xy(Rxy→xy∨x=y∨xy)
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1076 Priorean temporal logic
(b) Gp→Gp ∀xyz(xy∧Ryz→xz)
(c) Gp∧p→Gp ∀xyz(Rxy∧yz→xz∨Rxz)
(d) p→Fp ∀x∃y(xy∧Rxy)
(5) F(p∧Fq)∧F(¬p∧Fq)→F(p∧¬p∧Fq) (connectedness)
(6) all mirror images of the above axioms (swap G with H , and F with P; also swap  with  in
the correspondents).
The rules of inference are the standard ones:
(1) modus ponens: ϕ, ϕ→ψ
ψ
(2) generalization: ϕGϕ ,
ϕ
Hϕ
,
ϕ
ϕ
(3) substitution: ϕ(p)
ϕ(ψ/p)
Some mirror images, such asHp→HHp, are redundant and can be omitted.We have not investigated
the exact extent to which this can be done.
As usual, the logic axiomatized by this system is the smallest set L of L-formulas that contains
all the axioms listed above and is closed under the rules of inference. We say that an L-formula ϕ
is provable in the system if ϕ∈L, and consistent if ¬ϕ /∈L. A set  of L-formulas is consistent if
γ0∧ ...∧γn is consistent for every n∈N and γ0,...,γn∈, and maximal consistent if it is consistent
but has no proper consistent extension.
We aim to show that L is the L-logic of R. The inclusion ‘⊆’ (soundness) is straightforward:
Theorem 3.1
The system is sound over R.
Proof (sketch). All axioms other than axiom 5 are shown to be valid over any dense ﬂow of time
without endpoints in [28, Lemma 2.2(2)]. Axiom 5 is valid over R because every interval of R is
connected. Indeed, assume that for some model (R,h) and t∈R we have
(R,h),t |=F(p∧Fq)∧F(¬p∧Fq).
Let v1,v2> t satisfy (R,h),v1 |=p∧Fq and (R,h),v2 |=¬p∧Fq. We can ﬁnd u>max(v1,v2) with
u∈h(q). Assume wlog. that v1<v2. Let
s=sup{x∈R :∀y(v1≤y<x→y∈h(p))}.
Then t<v1≤s≤v2<u. Hence, (R,h),s |=Fq. By deﬁnition of s, we have (R,h),s |=p∧¬p. We
deduce that (R,h),t |=F(p∧¬p∧Fq) as required.
The inference rules obviously preserve validity. 
3.2 Simple theorems of the system
The ﬁrst three lemmas do not use the connectedness axiom 5 or its mirror image.
Lemma 3.2
F and P are provable in the system.
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Priorean temporal logic 1077
Proof. As  is a tautology, it is provable, and we get  by -generalization. By axiom 4d, we
prove F. We prove P similarly. 
Lemma 3.3
G¬p∧HFp→p is provable in the system.
Proof. We can prove G¬p∧¬p→G¬p by axiom 4c. By the mirror image of axiom 4d we
have G¬p→PG¬p. Using propositional tautologies we deduce G¬p∧¬p→¬HFp, and then
the result. 
The connectedness axiom (5) has an important consequence: the well known Prior axiom
Fq∧FG¬q→F(G¬q∧HFq). (1)
We will prove this using the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4
Gq→Gq and Hq→Hq are provable in the system.
Proof. The following are provable:
1. Gq→GPGq by axiom p→GPp
2. PGq→PGq Gq-instance of contrapositive of axiom 4b (Hp→Hp)
3. GPGq→GPGq from previous by G-generalization and normality
4. PGq→q contrapositive of temporal axiom p→HFp
5. GPGq→Gq from previous by G-generalization and normality
The result now follows from lines 1, 3 and 5 by propositional tautologies. The proof of Hq→Hq
is a mirror image. 
Now we will use the connectedness axiom for the ﬁrst time.
Corollary 3.5
The Prior axiom Fq∧FG¬q→F(G¬q∧HFq) and its mirror image are provable in the system.
Proof. We give a more informal proof along the lines of the preceding lemma. Assume Fq∧
FG¬q. Using the density axiom, this yields FFq∧FG¬q. Taking p=G¬q and q= in the
connectedness axiom (axiom 5) gives F(G¬q∧F)∧F(¬G¬q∧F)→F(G¬q∧¬G¬q∧
F). By Lemma 3.2, F is equivalent to , so this reduces to
FG¬q∧FFq→F(G¬q∧Fq).
So we obtain F(G¬q∧Fq). Now by standard temporal logic, we can prove Fq→HF(Fq) and
HF(Fq)→HFq. This gives us F(G¬q∧HFq). By Lemma 3.4, we obtain F(G¬q∧HFq) as
required. The mirror image can be derived similarly. 
Remark 3.6
In connection with the consequent of the Prior axiom, we point out that if M is a Kripke model,
w∈M, ϕ an L-formula, and M,w |=G¬ϕ∧HFϕ, then w is -irreﬂexive. For if ww then as
M,w |=HFϕ we have M,w |=Fϕ, contradicting M,w |=G¬ϕ.
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1078 Priorean temporal logic
4 Some facts about the L-logic of R
Here we prove some fairly straightforward results about the L-logic of R.
4.1 Complexity
We will see below that the L-logic of R does not have the ﬁnite model property. Since this property
is often used to show decidability, it may be surprising that the logic is decidable [28, p. 256]. We
begin by establishing its complexity.
Theorem 4.1
The problem of deciding whether an L-formula is valid over R is PSPACE-complete.
Proof (sketch). We assume knowledge of temporal logic with Until and Since (U,S) as in [26],
where it is proved that the problem of determining satisﬁability over R of a formula written with
U,S is PSPACE-complete. Given an L-formula ϕ, introduce a new propositional atom qψ for each
subformula ψ of ϕ, and deﬁne the formula ψ̂ as follows, where ∀ψ abbreviates ψ∧¬U(¬ψ,)∧
¬S(¬ψ,):
• ̂=∀q
• p̂=∀(p↔qp) for p∈PV
• ¬̂ψ=∀(q¬ψ ↔¬qψ )
• ψ̂∧χ=∀(qψ∧χ ↔qψ ∧qχ )
• F̂ψ=∀(qFψ ↔U(qψ,))
• P̂ψ=∀(qPψ ↔S(qψ,))
• ̂ψ=∀(qψ ↔qψ ∧U(,qψ )∧S(,qψ )).
Let ϕ∗ be the conjunction of all ψ̂ for subformulas ψ of ϕ, together with qϕ . It can be checked that ϕ
is satisﬁable over R iff ϕ∗ is, and that ϕ∗ can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. Given ϕ, we
may construct ϕ∗ and then decide its satisﬁability over R in PSPACE [26]. The combined procedure
can be done in polynomial space, so the satisﬁability, and hence the validity, of ϕ can be decided in
PSPACE. The logic of R with  alone is S4 [20], which is already PSPACE-hard [16]. 
4.2 Strong completeness
A Hilbert system (of axioms and rules) is said to be sound if all satisﬁable formulas are consistent,
and strongly complete if any consistent set of formulas using in all only countably many atoms is
satisﬁable.
Theorem 4.2
There is no sound and strongly complete Hilbert system for the L-logic of R.
Proof. Let  be the following set of formulas written with atoms p,q,r:
p
F(r∧G¬r)
G(r∨Fr→p∨q)
F(¬p∧F(¬q∧F(¬p∧F( ···∧Fr ))···)︸︷︷︸
n brackets
for each integer n≥1
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Priorean temporal logic 1079
It is easy to see that any ﬁnite subset of  is satisﬁable over R. However,  itself is not satisﬁable
over R. For suppose that is satisﬁed at 0 and r∧G¬r is true at 1, say. By the ﬁrst and third formulas,
each x∈[0,1] belongs to some open interval Ix ⊆R with Ix ⊆h(p) or Ix ⊆h(q). By the Heine–Borel
theorem, [0,1] is compact, so there are n∈N and x0< ···<xn−1 in [0,1] such that [0,1]⊆⋃i<nIxi .
By the ﬁnal set of formulas, there are 0<y0<y1< ···<yn<1 with yj /∈h(p) if j is even and yj /∈h(q)
if j is odd (each j≤n). Now by the pigeonhole principle and convexity of the Ix , there are i,j<n with
yj,yj+1∈ Ixi . But Ixi ⊆h(p) or Ixi ⊆h(q), a contradiction.
If the L-logic of R had a sound and strongly complete Hilbert system, then since  is ﬁnitely
satisﬁable, it would be consistent and so satisﬁable, contradicting the above. 
4.3 Kripke completeness
Finally, we consider Kripke completeness. I would like to thank Nick Bezhanishvili for helpful
discussions on this material. First, a minor lemma, used only here.
Lemma 4.3
Let F= (W ,,R) be a Kripke frame that validates the axioms of Section 3.1. Suppose that w,u,
x∈W satisfy wu, wx and ¬(xu). Then there is y∈W satisfying wy, ¬(yu) and Ryu.
Proof. Let w,u,x∈W be as stated. Let h :PV →W be an assignment with h(p)={u}, and let N =
(W ,,R,h). Since ¬(xu), we have N ,x |=G¬p. As wu,x, this gives N ,w |=Fp∧FG¬p. As all
axioms are valid in F and frame validity is preserved by the inference rules, by Corollary 3.5 the
Prior axiom (1) is valid in F , so N ,w |=F(G¬p∧HFp). Hence there is y∈W with wy and
N ,y |=G¬p∧HFp. (2)
Hence, ¬(yu). By (2) and Lemma 3.3, N ,y |=p. So Ryu. 
We will now consider the following formula θ , where a,b are atoms:
θ=H¬a∧H¬b∧¬a∧¬b∧a∧b∧G¬(a∧b)∧FG¬a. (3)
Lemma 4.4
The formula θ is satisﬁable over R, but is not satisﬁable in any Kripke model whose frame validates
the axioms of Section 3.1.
Proof. Let h :PV →℘(R) be an assignment satisfying h(a)={1/2n :n∈N} and h(b)={2/3n :n∈N}.
Evidently, (R,h),0 |=θ . So θ is satisﬁable over R.
Let M= (W ,,R,h) be a Kripke model whose frame F= (W ,,R) validates the axioms of
Section 3.1. Let w∈W and assume for contradiction that M,w |=θ .
Recall from Deﬁnition 2.1 that R(w)={u∈W :Rwu}. Plainly, M,w |=a∧b, so there are u,v∈
R(w) with M,u |=a and M,v |=b. Now the correspondents of the axioms in Section 3.1, where
given, are all true in F . By (the correspondent of) axiom 4a, uw∨uw. As M,w |=H¬a∧¬a,
we cannot have uw. So uw. Since also Rwv, by axiom 4b we obtain uv. Similarly, vu. By
the S4 axioms,  is transitive, so {u,v} is contained in a -cluster.
As M,w |=FG¬a, we can choose x∈W with wx and M,x |=G¬a. Since M,u |=a, we have
¬(xu). So by Lemma 4.3, there is y∈W with wy, ¬(yu), and Ryu. But also, uv, so by
axiom 4c we obtain Ryv∨yv.
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If Ryv, then both u,v∈R(y), so M,y |=a∧b. Since wy, we obtain M,w |=F(a∧b),
contradicting that M,w |=θ . If instead yv, then since vu we have yu, contradicting that
¬(yu). Either way, our assumption that M,w |=θ has led to a contradiction. 
Readers wondering whether θ could be simpliﬁed to a formula with only one atom should bear in
mind that H¬a∧¬a∧a∧G¬a is not satisﬁable over R, and its negation is provable (the proof
uses axiom 4a and the S4 reﬂexivity axiom for ). Separately, Lemma 4.4 fails if the ﬁnal conjunct
FG¬a is omitted from θ . We will return to this example in Sections 5 and 7.6.
Recall that a modal logic L is said to be Kripke complete (respectively, to have the ﬁnite model
property) if there exists a class K of (resp. ﬁnite) Kripke frames such that L is the set of all modal
formulas that are valid in every frame in K.
Theorem 4.5
The L-logic of R is not Kripke complete and does not have the ﬁnite model property.
Proof. If the L-logic of R were the logic of a class K of Kripke frames of the form (W ,,R), then
as the formula θ in (3) is satisﬁable over R, it would be satisﬁable over a frame inK. By Lemma 4.4,
such a frame could not validate the axioms of Section 3.1. So by Theorem 3.1, it could not validate
the logic of R either. 
As N. Bezhanishvili has observed, the L-logic of R is a ‘naturally occurring’ example of a non-
Kripke complete logic.
5 Towards completeness
The main aim of the article is to show that the Hilbert system given in Section 3.1 is sound and
complete for the L-logic of R. In this section, we take some ﬁrst steps in that direction.
5.1 A problem
We begin by observing that certain naïve approaches will not succeed. For example, we might try to
prove that every consistent formula is satisﬁable in some ﬁnite Kripke model whose frame (W ,,R)
has the following special form. Ordered by, which is transitive and prelinear, it falls into a sequence
C0u0C1u1 ···un−1Cn,
where n≥0, the Ci are-clusters, the ui are-irreﬂexive, the relation is deﬁned between sets and
points as in Deﬁnition 5.1(1), and R(ui)=Ci∪{ui}∪Ci+1 for each i<n. (Recall that R(ui)={w∈
W :Ruiw}.) We could also require that every cluster is connected as an R-frame—see Deﬁnition 5.2
for the meaning of this. It would then be not so hard to construct a model over R satisfying the
formula.
This idea is unlikely to work—by Theorem 4.5, the logic of R is not characterized by any class
of ﬁnite frames at all. And in fact, the formula θ of (3)—which is consistent since it is satisﬁable
over R—is not satisﬁable in any Kripke model of this form. For, θ being true at a world w would
force w to be irreﬂexive—say w=ui—and a and b to be true at some worlds in the cluster Ci+1
immediately following ui in the order . This cluster could not be -ﬁnal in the model because of
the conjunct FG¬a of θ . So i+1<n. But now, a∧b would be true at ui+1, contradicting the
truth of G¬(a∧b) at ui.
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5.2 
-linked models
So it seems that we are forced to work with Kripke models that may contain adjacent -clusters
with no intervening irreﬂexive point. (Since the L-logic of R is not Kripke complete, it seems that
we cannot work with frames and have to use models.) We will focus our attention on ‘nice’ models
in which any two such clusters contain ‘similar’ points. We will show that any consistent formula is
satisﬁable in a nice Kripke model, and that any such model can be transformed into a model over R.
To deﬁne ‘nice’, we need the following somewhat disparate preliminary deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 5.1
Let M= (W ,,R,h) be a Kripke model.
(1) For X,Y ⊆W , we write XY if xy for every x∈X and y∈Y . We abbreviate {x}Y to
xY , etc.
(2) We say that an ordered pair (C,D) of -clusters in M is
• consecutive (in M) if C =D and {u∈W :u-reﬂexive, CuD}=C∪D,
• adjacent (in M) if C =D and {u∈W :CuD}=C∪D.
In each case, CD. Consecutive clusters have no -reﬂexive points between them, but may
have -irreﬂexive ones. Adjacent clusters have nothing between them.
Deﬁnition 5.2
A frame (W ,R) is said to be connected if there do not exist non-empty disjoint R-generated subsets
X,Y ⊆W with W =X∪Y .
Deﬁnition 5.3
Let 
 be a set of L-formulas.
(1) We write B
 for the set of formulas in 
 of the form θ , Gθ or Hθ (the ‘box-formulas’).
(2) Let M= (W ,,R,h) be a Kripke model. We deﬁne an equivalence relation ≡M
 on W by:
c≡M
 d iff for every ψ ∈
, we have M,c |=ψ iff M,d |=ψ .
We can now give our deﬁnition of ‘nice’ model:
Deﬁnition 5.4
Let 
 be a set of L-formulas. We say that a Kripke model M= (W ,,R,h) is 
-linked if:
(1) W is ﬁnite.
(2) The frame (W ,,R) validates all axioms of Section 3.1 (including mirror images), except
possibly the connectedness axiom 5 and its mirror image.
(3) The relation  is prelinear (see Deﬁnition 2.1(6)).
(4) For every -cluster C⊆W , the frame (C,RC) is connected.
(5) For every pair (C,D) of adjacent -clusters in M, there are c∈C and d∈D with c≡MB
 d.
In a 
-linked model M, adjacent clusters are ‘linked’ by ‘similar’ (formally, ≡MB
 -equivalent)
points. Agreement of these points on formulas θ ∈
 is critical for our later work—in Lemma 7.25
in particular. Their agreement on formulas Gθ and Hθ is more a convenience that allows a simple
deﬁnition of ‘nice’ model. Condition 4 is weaker than saying that the frame of M validates the
connectedness axiom 5. For example, ifM consists of two-reﬂexive points c,d, with cd, ¬Rcd,
¬Rdc,M,c |=p andM,d |=¬p, thenM is ∅-linked but does not validate the connectedness axiom.
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5.3 Structure of 
-linked models
By Deﬁnition 5.4, the frame of a 
-linked model validates the Shehtman axioms, and these impose
considerable structure on Kripke frames validating them. The following lemma sheds a lot of light
on this structure. It can be obtained from [28, Lemmas 3.5–3.6], but we give a proof to make the
article more self-contained.
Lemma 5.5 (λ,ρ-lemma)
Let F= (W ,,R) be a Kripke frame that validates the axioms of Section 3.1 except possibly the
connectedness axiom 5 and its mirror image, and let w∈W .
(1) Every -cluster in F is an R-generated subset of W .
(2) If w is -reﬂexive then R(w) is a subset of a -cluster.
(3) If w is-irreﬂexive, then there are disjoint-clusters λ(w), ρ(w) such that R(w)=λ(w)∪{w}∪
ρ(w). For every t∈W we have tw iff tλ(w), and w t iff ρ(w) t.
Proof. Since F validates all axioms in Section 3.1 with ﬁrst-order correspondents, those
correspondents are true inF . To prove part 1 of the lemma, letC⊆W be a-cluster and letw∈C. By
Lemma 2.3, C={u∈W :uw} (recall from Deﬁnition 2.2 that uw denotes that uw∧wu).
By axiom 4b and its mirror image, C is R-generated.
For part 2, suppose that ww. By Lemma 2.3, w is contained in a-cluster C={u∈W :uw}.
By part 1, C is R-generated, so R(w)⊆C.
For part 3, suppose that ¬(ww) and let
λ(w)=R(w)∩{u∈W :uw},
ρ(w)=R(w)∩{u∈W :wu}.
These sets are non-empty by axiom 4d and its mirror image, and disjoint as w is irreﬂexive and 
transitive. By axiom 4a we have R(w)=λ(w)∪{w}∪ρ(w).
We show that λ(w) is a -cluster. If t∈W and u∈λ(w), then axiom 4b and -transitivity yield
tw iff tu. (4)
Recalling that λ(w) =∅, pick arbitrary u∈λ(w). Taking t=u in (4), we see that u is -reﬂexive, so
by Lemma 2.3 again, the set U={v∈W :vu} is a -cluster.
We show that λ(w)=U. By (4), tv for all t,v∈λ(w), and it follows that λ(w)⊆U. To show that
U⊆λ(w), let t∈U be arbitrary. Since uw, by-transitivity we have tw. Also, Rwu∧u t, so by
axiom 4c, w t∨Rwt. If w t, then as tw and is transitive, we would have ww, contradicting
irreﬂexivity of w. So ¬(w t), and hence Rwt. We already have tw, so t∈λ(w). As t∈U was
arbitrary, U⊆λ(w) as required.
The last claim in the lemma (for λ) is immediate from (4). The case of ρ is handled similarly. 
It follows from the lemma that for-irreﬂexive w we have uwv for every u∈λ(w) and v∈ρ(w),
by taking t=u and t=v. That is, λ(w)wρ(w). We can think of λ(w) as the set of points lying
inﬁnitesimally near to w in the past, and ρ(w) as the set of points lying inﬁnitesimally near to w in
the future.
We can now elucidate the structure of a 
-linked model M= (W ,,R,h). Recall that xy
means xy∧yx. For x,y∈W deﬁne x∼y iff x=y∨xy. As is transitive, ∼ is an equivalence
relation on W . Each equivalence class is either a singleton consisting of an -irreﬂexive point, or
(by Lemma 2.3) a -cluster. As  is prelinear, we can enumerate the clusters without repetitions
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as C0,...,Ck , with C0C1 ···Ck . Each remaining ∼-class, if any, is a singleton {u} with u -
irreﬂexive. The frame F= (W ,,R) validates the axioms required by Lemma 5.5, so for each such
u the sets λ(u),ρ(u) are deﬁned and are -clusters. Say, λ(u)=Ci. By the lemma, Ciu, and uw
iff ρ(u)w for each w∈W . It follows that i<k and ρ(u)=Ci+1. If u,v are irreﬂexive and uv,
then by the lemma, uρ(u)λ(v)v (possibly ρ(u)=λ(v)), so for each i<k there is at most one
irreﬂexive point lying between Ci and Ci+1.
We conclude that for some ﬁnite k≥0, the frame (W ,) is the union of distinct -clusters
C0C1 ···Ck and-irreﬂexive points ui (i∈ I) for some I⊆{0,...,k−1}, with Ci=λ(ui)ui
ρ(ui)=Ci+1 for each i∈ I . We never get two adjacent irreﬂexive points. This is as in the suggested
form of frames in Section 5.1, except that we may get two adjacent -clusters with no intervening
irreﬂexive point. In this case, they are linked by containing ≡MB
 -equivalent points.
5.4 Problem resolved
We saw in Section 5.1 that the formula θ of (3) is not satisﬁable in any model whose frame is as
described there. Let us now show that θ is satisﬁable in a linked model.
Proposition 5.6
The formula
θ=H¬a∧H¬b∧¬a∧¬b∧a∧b∧G¬(a∧b)∧FG¬a
of (3) is satisﬁed in a 
-linked model, where 
 is the set of subformulas of θ .
Proof. The formula θ is true at world u0 in the Kripke model M= (W ,R,,h) shown in Figure 1.
In the ﬁgure, the black dots are -irreﬂexive and the white dots are -reﬂexive. The relation  is
given by the left-to-right ordering, except within each-cluster Ci (i≤3) where of course all points
are -related. The relation R is given by the reﬂexive closure of the arrows. The atoms a,b are true
only where shown at u2 and the two upper points in C1.
Let 
 be the set of subformulas of θ . Recalling that abbreviates ¬¬ and F abbreviates ¬G¬,
the set B
 of ‘box-formulas’ in 
 is
B
={H¬a,H¬b,¬a,¬b,G¬(a∧b),GFa,G¬a}.
We claim thatM is 
-linked. It is ﬁnite, and its frame validates all axioms in Section 3.1 (including
mirror images), except possibly the connectedness axiom 5 and its mirror image. Obviously, the
relation  is prelinear and the frame (C,RC) is connected for each -cluster C. The only adjacent
-clusters inM are C1 and C2, and the lower dots d1, s2 in them are ≡MB
 -equivalent—¬a,¬b,
and G¬(a∧b) are true at both of them, and H¬a, H¬b, GFa, and G¬a are false. SoM is indeed

-linked. 
We will return to this example in Section 7.6.
Figure 1. Kripke model M satisfying θ .
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5.5 Strategy of completeness proof
Our approach to proving completeness will now be as follows.
Step 1. We show that any formula ϕ0 that is consistent with the system of Section 3.1 is satisﬁable in
a 
-linked Kripke model, where 
 is the set of subformulas of Pϕ0. This is done in Section 6.
Step 2. Given any 
-linked model, where 
 is a ﬁnite set of formulas closed under subformulas,
we construct a model over R that satisﬁes the same formulas from 
. This is done in Section 7.
These two steps are of roughly equal length and can be read in either order. Readers may prefer
to read Section 7 ﬁrst, as 
-linked models may be better motivated that way. Completeness of the
system follows immediately by putting the two steps together—this will be done in Theorem 8.1.
6 Consistent formulas have linked models
In this section we prove the following.
Theorem 6.1
Let ϕ0 be an L-formula that is consistent with the system of Section 3.1. Let 
 be a ﬁnite set of
L-formulas containing Pϕ0 and closed under taking subformulas. Then ϕ0 is satisﬁable in a
-linked
Kripke model.
To prove it, we will successively construct ﬁve Kripke models M0,...,M4 satisfying ϕ0 and
getting closer to our goal. The ﬁrst three are exactly as in Shehtman’s axiomatization of the logic
of F,P, over Q in [28]. The last, M4, will be a 
-linked model satisfying ϕ0. Each Mi will be
written (Wi,i,Ri,hi), but sometimes we drop the index i from these entries. Also, we sometimes
identify (notationally) Mi with its domain Wi.
(0) M0 is the canonical model.
(1) M1 is a generated submodel of M0 satisfying ϕ0, in which the relation  is prelinear.
(2) M2 is got by ﬁltrating all -clusters of M1, which consequently become ﬁnite.
(3) M3 is a ﬁniteR-generated submodel ofM2 got by selective ﬁltration for.We use prelinearity
and the Prior axiom to obtain it.
(4) M4 is obtained fromM3 by adding some extra points to arrange that any two adjacent clusters
contain≡M4B
 -equivalent points.We use the Prior axiom and induction on the number of ‘≡M2B
 -
types’ of points in an interval.
As we go, we will indicate why we apparently cannot jump from our latest model directly to a model
of ϕ0 over R.
Now to the details. Let ϕ0 be an L-formula consistent with the system deﬁned in Section 3.1. We
will explain in turn how each model M0,...,M4 is constructed.
6.1 Model M0
This is just the canonical model of the system given in Section 3.1, over the set PV of atoms. So W0
is the set of all maximal consistent sets ofL-formulas. We write ,,,,... for arbitrary members
of W0. The relations and assignment are deﬁned by:
• 0 iff ϕ∈ for every formula Gϕ∈ (this is equivalent to each of the three statements
ϕ∈⇒Fϕ∈, Hϕ∈⇒ϕ∈, and ϕ∈⇒Pϕ∈),
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• R0 iff ϕ∈ for every formula ϕ∈ (equivalently, ϕ∈⇒ϕ∈),
• h0(p)={∈W0 :p∈} for each atom p∈PV .
We assume familiarity with basic facts about canonical models—see, e.g. [3, 5] for details. The most
important ones are thatM0, |=ϕ iff ϕ∈, for each ∈M0 and each L-formula ϕ, all substitution
instances of axioms from Section 3.1 are valid in M0, and the ﬁrst-order correspondents listed in
Section 3.1 are true in the canonical frame (W0,0,R0). For example, 0 is transitive and R0 is
reﬂexive and transitive. All substitution instances of the connectedness axiom 5 are valid inM0, but
we do not know that this axiom is valid in the canonical frame.
6.2 Model M1
Since ϕ0 is consistent, we can take0∈W0 containing ϕ0, and thenM0,0 |=ϕ0. SoM0 satisﬁes ϕ0.
However,M0 is a little unwieldy for us. Much of it is irrelevant: it has smaller and more manageable
submodels satisfying ϕ0, and in particular, ones in which is prelinear. So our ﬁrst step is to restrict
to such a submodel.
We deﬁne M1= (W1,1,R1,h1) to be the submodel of M0 with domain W1={∈W0 :0
0∨00}. Let us establish its basic properties.
Lemma 6.2
M1 is a generated submodel of M0 in which 1 is prelinear. The model M1 satisﬁes ϕ0.
Proof. Suppose∈W1,∈W0, and0.We show that∈W1. If00 then by transitivity,
00 and so ∈W1. If not, then 00,, and we obtain ∈W1 by the correspondent of the
mirror image PFp→p∨Fp∨Pp of the linearity axiom. So M1 is a0-generated submodel of M0.
By symmetry, M1 is also a 0-generated submodel of M0. A similar argument, left to the reader,
shows that 1 is prelinear as in Deﬁnition 2.1(6).
To show that M1 is an R0-generated submodel as well, note that if ∈W1, ∈W0, and R0,
then by the correspondent of axiom 4a we have 0 or 0. As W1 is0- and0-generated,
∈W1.
Hence, M1 is a generated submodel of M0. By Lemma 2.3, M1,0 |=ϕ0 and ϕ0 is satisﬁed
in M1. 
AsM1 is a generated submodel ofM0, Lemma 2.3 tells us that all substitution instances of axioms
from Section 3.1 are valid inM1 and all axioms other than the connectedness axiom 5 (and its mirror
image) are valid in its frame. Hence, the ﬁrst-order correspondents of these axioms are true in the
frame of M1. The following is now immediate from Lemma 5.5 (see also [28, Lemma 3.6]).
Lemma 6.3
Every 1-cluster in M1 is an R1-generated subset of W1.
To end, we establish the perhaps surprising result that M1 contains initial and ﬁnal 1-clusters
(possibly equal).
Lemma 6.4
There are 1-clusters C∞,C−∞⊆W1 such that C−∞11C∞ for every ∈W1.
Proof. Let 0={Pϕ :ϕ is satisﬁed in M1}. Then 0 is consistent. For suppose that n>0 is ﬁnite
and ϕ0,...,ϕn−1 are satisﬁed in M1 at 0,...,n−1, respectively. Choose i<n such that |{j<n :
j 1i}| is maximal. It follows by prelinearity and transitivity of 1 that for every j<n we have
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j 1i. By Lemma 3.2, F∈i, so there is ∈M1 with i1. Then 0,...,n−11, so
Pϕ0,...,Pϕn−1∈, proving consistency of 0.
Let ⊇0 be maximal consistent. Then ∈W0. Let ∈W1 be arbitrary. Then ϕ∈⇒Pϕ∈
0⊆, so 0. This means that ∈W1 and that  is a 1-greatest point in M1. Hence also,
1, so  lies in a 1-cluster C∞, say, of M1. Since C∞ is a cluster, transitivity of 1 yields
that 1C∞ as required.
The cluster C−∞ is obtained by a mirror image argument. 
6.3 Model M2
There is little hope of obtaining directly from M1 a model over R satisfying ϕ0. For one thing, if
we could do it, it would be likely that any consistent set of formulas could be shown satisﬁable over
R, contradicting Theorem 4.2. The more practical problem is that we do not know enough about
1 and R1. We can glean some information about them from Lemma 5.5. Essentially, M1 consists
of 1-irreﬂexive points and 1-clusters. To make a real model, we would like to ‘represent’ each
cluster C over R, using methods originating in [20] (see Section 7). Unfortunately, it is not clear that
the frame (C,R1 C) is connected. This makes the task hard—and in the 
-linked model that we aim
to build, clusters must be connected.
The purpose of our next modelM2 is to make all-clusters connected.We achieve this by making
them ﬁnite, using a certain ﬁltration of M1 due to Shehtman [28, Section 3]. The connectedness
axiom can then be used to prove that every 2-cluster in M2 is connected. We will also show that
M2 contains certain well-behaved submodels, which will be used to construct the ﬁnal model M4.
So our study of M2 will be quite elaborate.
6.3.1 Deﬁnition of M2
We will need a ﬁnite set of formulas to deﬁne the ﬁltration. It will be the set 
 of Theorem 6.1—a
ﬁnite set of formulas containing Pϕ0 and closed under taking subformulas. Our ﬁltration equivalence
relation is now deﬁned as in [28, Section 3]. Recall again that  means that  and .
Let ∼ be the binary relation on W1 deﬁned by:
∼ ⇐⇒ =∨((1)∧(∩
=∩
)). (5)
As 1 is transitive, ∼ is an equivalence relation on W1.
Deﬁnition 6.5
For ∈W1 we write /∼ for the equivalence class {∈W1 :∼}. For X⊆W1, we write X/∼ for
the set {/∼:∈X} of equivalence classes having a non-empty intersection with X .
Generally, but not always, X will be ∼-closed (i.e., a union of ∼-classes).
The domain W2 of M2 is now deﬁned to be the set W1/∼ of ∼-equivalence classes in M1. The
relations on M2 are: 2 is induced existentially from 1, and R2 is the transitive closure of the
relation induced existentially from R1. Formally:
2={(/∼,/∼) :,∈W1, 1},
R02={(/∼,/∼) :,∈W1, R1},
R2 is the transitive closure of R02.
We set h2(p)={/∼:∈W1, p∈} for each atom p∈PV . This deﬁnes the model M2.
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In case of doubt, we remark that the expressions above are of the form {f (x) :x∈X} for some set X
and some class function f deﬁned on X , and thus are well-deﬁned sets by the axiom of replacement
of ZF. For example, for 2 we can take X=1 and f : (,) → (/∼,/∼).
6.3.2 Filtration lemma for M2
Filtration is designed to preserve truth of formulas, so let us conﬁrm this ﬁrst. To begin, it is worth
knowing that 2 is closely related to 1:
Lemma 6.6
Let ,∈W1. Then 1 iff /∼2/∼.
Proof. If 1 then /∼2/∼ by deﬁnition of 2. Conversely, if /∼2/∼ then by
deﬁnition of 2 there are ′,′ ∈W1 with ∼′, ∼′, and ′1′. The deﬁnition of ∼ gives
1′ and ′ 1, so 1 by transitivity of 1. 
In [28], a ‘ﬁltration lemma’ is proved: all formulas in 
 are preserved from M1 to M2. Because
of the simple deﬁnition of 2, we can actually go a little further:
Lemma 6.7 (ﬁltration)
Letψ be anL-formula formed from formulas in
 by using only the Boolean and temporal operators
(without using or). Then for all∈W1 we haveM2,/∼|=ψ iffM1, |=ψ (iffψ ∈). Hence,
ϕ0 is satisﬁed in M2.
Proof. By induction on ψ . If ψ ∈
, the result is proved in [28, Lemmas 3.2–3.3]. The Boolean
cases are easy and left to the reader. Assuming the result for ψ , we prove it for Gψ . Let ∈W1 be
given. Then the following are equivalent:
M2,/∼|=Gψ
M2,/∼|=ψ for all ∈W1 with /∼2/∼ by semantics of G,
M1, |=ψ for all ∈W1 with 1 by ind. hyp. & Lemma 6.6,
M1, |=Gψ by semantics of G.
The case Hψ is similar.
We know there is some 0∈W1 containing ϕ0. As ϕ0∈
, the above yields M2,0/∼|=ϕ0, so
ϕ0 is satisﬁed in M2. 
6.3.3 Structure of M2
We will need some simple facts about the form of M2. Happily, by [28, Lemma 3.3], the frame of
M2 validates all axioms of the system of Section 3.1 other than axiom 5 (connectedness) and its
mirror image. Hence, their correspondents are true in the frame (W2,2,R2), and Lemma 5.5 applies.
Some limited instances of (connectedness and) the Prior axiom are also valid in M2:
Lemma 6.8
Let β be anL-formula formed from formulas in 
 by using only the Boolean and temporal operators
(without using  or ). Then the β-instance
π=Fβ∧FG¬β→F(G¬β∧HFβ)
of the Prior axiom is valid in M2.
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Proof. Take any w∈W2 and ∈w. By Corollary 3.5, the Prior axiom is provable, so  contains
all substitution instances of it. So π ∈. This formula is made from formulas in 
 by using only the
Boolean and temporal operators, so by the ﬁltrationLemma6.7we obtainM2,w |=π as required. 
However, in Lemmas 6.12 and 6.20 we will need arbitrary instances of these axioms, and we do not
know that they are valid in M2. They are of course valid in M1, so we will work in M1 in these
lemmas.
Lemma 6.9
(1) The relation 2 is transitive and prelinear.
(2) If X⊆W1 is a 1-cluster in M1 then X/∼ is a 2-cluster in M2.
(3) If C⊆W2 is a 2-cluster in M2 then⋃C is a 1-cluster in M1.
(4) Every 2-cluster in M2 is a ﬁnite R2-generated subset of W2.
Proof. The relation 1 is transitive (since M1⊆M0 and 0 is transitive), and prelinear (by
Lemma 6.2), and it follows from Lemma 6.6 that 2 is as well. This proves part 1.
For parts 2–3, let X⊆W1 and C⊆W2 be sets. Plainly, X⊆⋃(X/∼) and C= (⋃C)/∼. Call X a
1-precluster if 1 for every ,∈X , and C a 2-precluster if c2 d for every c,d∈C. By
Lemma 6.6, parts 2 and 3 hold if we replace ‘cluster’ by ‘precluster’. A cluster is just a maximal
precluster, and by Zorn’s lemma, every precluster extends to a cluster.
Suppose that X is a 1-cluster. Then X/∼ is a 2-precluster. Extend it to a 2-cluster D. Then
X⊆⋃(X/∼)⊆⋃D, and since ⋃D is a 1-precluster we have X=⋃D. So X/∼= (⋃D)/∼=D,
a 2-cluster.
Suppose that C is a2-cluster. Then
⋃
C is a1-precluster. Extend it to a1-cluster Y . Then C=
(⋃C)/∼⊆Y/∼, and since Y/∼ is a 2-precluster we have C=Y/∼. So Y ⊆⋃(Y/∼)=⋃C⊆Y .
Consequently,
⋃
C=Y is a 1-cluster.
For part 4, let C be a 2-cluster. Then C has the form Y/∼ for a 1-cluster Y =⋃C, and by
deﬁnition of ∼, for each ,∈Y we have ∼ iff ∩
=∩
. Hence, the map f :C→℘(
)
given by f (/∼)=∩
 is well deﬁned and one-one, so |C|≤|℘(
)| and C is ﬁnite (this is [28,
Lemma 3.4]). That C is R2-generated follows from Lemma 5.5. 
Lemma 6.4 also extends to M2:
Lemma 6.10
The sets C∞/∼,C−∞/∼ are 2-clusters in M2, and for every w∈W2 we have C−∞/∼2w2
C∞/∼.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 6.4, 6.6 and 6.9. 
6.3.4 Connectedness of -clusters in M2
By Lemma 6.9, all 2-clusters in M2 are ﬁnite, and using the connectedness axiom, we can prove
that they are connected as R2-frames. To do this, we ﬁrst write down formulas to deﬁne individual
elements within a 2-cluster.
Deﬁnition 6.11
For w∈M2 let χw=∧(
∩)∧¬∨(
 \) for arbitrary ∈w. (By convention, ∧∅= and∨∅=⊥.)
By deﬁnition of ∼ in (5), this deﬁnition is independent of the choice of , and obviously χw∈.
The set {χw :w∈M2} is ﬁnite, because 
 is ﬁnite.
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Lemma 6.12
Let C be a 2-cluster in M2. Then (C,R2 C) is a connected frame.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that C is a2-cluster inM2 that is the union of disjoint non-empty
R2-generated sets X,Y . Let α=∨w∈Xχw. Then α deﬁnes X within C: for any ∈⋃C we have
α∈ ⇐⇒ /∼∈X. (6)
Choose any ∈⋃C and let
0={α,¬α}∪{Fγ,Pγ :γ ∈}.
We show that 0 is consistent. Since  is closed under conjunction, it sufﬁces to take arbitrary
γ ∈ and show that δ=α∧¬α∧Fγ ∧Pγ is consistent. Choose any X ∈⋃X and Y ∈⋃
Y . By Lemma 6.9,
⋃
C is a 1-cluster in M1. So X1 and similarly for Y . Now
α∧Fγ ∈X and ¬α∧Fγ ∈Y . So F(α∧Fγ ),F(¬α∧Fγ )∈. By the connectedness axiom 5,
F(α∧¬α∧Fγ )∈. By temporal axioms, GPγ ∈ as well, so Fδ∈. If δ is inconsistent then
¬δ and hence G¬δ are provable, so G¬δ∈, contradicting its consistency. So δ is consistent, as
required.
So we may take ∈M0 with ⊇0. By deﬁnition of 0 we have 0, so ∈M1 and
∈⋃C.Asα,¬α∈, we may ﬁndX ,Y ∈R0() with α∈X and ¬α∈Y . ThenX ,Y ∈
R1() as M1 is a generated submodel of M0. By Lemma 6.3,
⋃
C is an R1-generated subset of
M1, so X ,Y ∈⋃C as well.
Let w=/∼, wX =X/∼, and wY =Y/∼. By (6), wX ∈X and wY ∈Y . By deﬁnition of R2, we
havewX ,wY ∈R2(w). Sincew∈X∪Y , this contradicts thatX andY are disjoint andR2-generated. 
6.3.5 Submodels of M2
It may appear that M2 could be our ﬁnal Kripke model. Each 2-cluster C in M2 is ﬁnite and
connected as an R2-frame, so classical work (see Section 7) will give us a model over R respecting
truth within C. We can represent an2-irreﬂexive point ofM2 by a single point of R. Could we not
string these together somehow, to make a model over R satisfying ϕ0?
To do so would require the following. Let J be the linear order obtained from (W2,2) by replacing
each 2-cluster by a copy of R. Then we would need J∼=R.
There is no reason to suppose that J∼=R. For example, M2 may have uncountably many 2-
clusters. (Indeed, the argument of Theorem 4.2 can be used to create an example in which J ∼=R.)
Even a ﬁnite submodel of M2 may not work: if we form J for it as we did for M2, we may still not
have J∼=R, because the submodelmay have consecutive-clusters that are actually adjacent, with no
intervening point. Consideration of the formula θ of (3) shows that this can indeed happen. Replacing
the two adjacent clusters by copies of R gives a linear order isomorphic to ((−1,0)∪(0,1),<). This
is not Dedekind complete—it has a ‘gap’ at 0. It follows that J ∼=R in this case.
In 
-linked models, any two adjacent clusters contain ‘similar’ points satisfying exactly the same
formulas ψ,Gψ,Hψ ∈
. They allow us to ‘ﬁll the gap’. So we will now show that M2 contains
abundant ﬁnite submodels with this property. This is in a sense the heart of the article. It will lead us
shortly to our ﬁnal model M4.
First we introduce formulas that will help us to pick out ‘similar’ points. Recall (Deﬁnition 5.3)
that B
 is the set of all formulas in 
 of the form ψ , Gψ , or Hψ (the ‘box-formulas’).
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Deﬁnition 6.13
(1) For a subset B⊆B
, let βB= (∧B)∧¬∨(B
 \B).
(2) For a Kripke modelM and w∈M, we write τM(w) (or if no ambiguity is likely, τ (w)) for the
set {ψ ∈B
 :M,w |=ψ}.
We think of τM(w) as the ‘type’ of w in M. The following is proved by standard boolean
manipulations.
Lemma 6.14
(1) For every Kripke model M and w∈M, the set τM(w) is the unique subset B⊆B
 with
M,w |=βB.
(2) For every ∈W1, the set τM1 () is the unique subset B⊆B
 such that βB∈. Indeed,
τM1 ()=∩B
.
(3) For every Kripke model M and c,d∈M, we have c≡MB
 d (so c and d are ‘similar’) iff
τM(c)=τM(d).
So to show that two clusters C,D contain similar points, it sufﬁces to ﬁnd points c∈C and d∈D of
the same type—satisfying the same formula βB for some B⊆B
. We will use the Prior axiom to do
this. However, because this axiom delivers an -irreﬂexive point after which a formula is false but
at which the formula may actually be true (see Remark 3.6), whereas we want a point in a cluster,
we will actually use βB rather than βB.
Not every world in a model satisﬁes some βB, so (roughly) we now pick out the worlds that do.
We will call such worlds links, because they will ‘link’ adjacent clusters.
We would like to deﬁne w∈W2 to be a link if M2,w |=βB for some B. Unfortunately, there is a
second complication. We would like to use the Prior axiom to ﬁnd a point satisfying some βB. But
we do not know that theβB-instance of the Prior axiom is valid inM2. Moreover, the point should
also lie in a certain temporal range, and to achieve this we will need to work in M1, where 1 is
deﬁned by formulas. Now the Prior axiom is valid in M1, and it will deliver points of M1 in the
right range and satisfying βB, but their ‘representatives’ (their ∼-classes) in M2 may not satisfy
βB as the ﬁltration Lemma 6.7 does not apply to β. Consequently, with this deﬁnition of ‘link’
we cannot guarantee that adjacent clusters will contain ‘similar’ points. So in the formal deﬁnition
of ‘link’, we work directly in M1:
Deﬁnition 6.15
An element w∈W2 is said to be a link if βB∈⋃w for some B⊆B
—that is, there are ∈w and
B⊆B
 with βB∈.
We ﬁrst show that links are rather common, and that they work well enough to deliver ‘similar’
points.
Lemma 6.16
Every 2-cluster in M2 contains a link.
Proof. Let C be a 2-cluster in M2. By Lemma 6.9(4), C is ﬁnite and R2-generated. Let c∈C be
such that |R2(c)| is least possible. We will show that c is a link.
Let B=τ (c). First we show that M2,c |=βB. So take arbitrary d∈R2(c). As C is R2-generated,
d∈C. By transitivity ofR2 we haveR2(d)⊆R2(c), so by choice of cwehaveR2(d)=R2(c).Moreover,
since c2d, by transitivity of2 we see that for allw∈W2 we havew2 c iffw2 d, andw2 c iff
w2 d. So c and d ‘see’ the same elements of W2 via R2,2, and2. It plainly follows that c≡M2B
 d,
so B=τ (c)=τ (d) and hence M2,d |=βB as well. As d was arbitrary, M2,c |=βB as required.
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Now let ∈c be arbitrary; we will show that βB∈, so that c is a link by deﬁnition. Let
∈R1() be arbitrary, and let d=/∼∈W2. By deﬁnition of R2 we have d∈R2(c), so by the
above, M2,d |=βB. As βB is a Boolean combination of formulas in 
, the ﬁltration Lemma 6.7
yields βB∈. As  was arbitrary, we obtain βB∈. 
Lemma 6.17
Let B⊆B
 and w∈M2. Then βB∈⋃w iff w is a link and τ (w)=B.
Proof. If βB∈∈w, then w is plainly a link. By the S4 reﬂexivity axiom, βB∈ as well. By the
ﬁltration Lemma 6.7, M2,w |=βB, so by lemma 6.14, τ (w)=B.
Conversely, suppose that w is a link. By deﬁnition,βB′ ∈
⋃
w for some B′ ⊆B
. By the ﬁrst part,
τ (w)=B′. So if additionally τ (w)=B, we have B′ =B and hence βB∈⋃w. 
We will need to count the types of links in an interval:
Deﬁnition 6.18
For 2-clusters C,D⊆M2 with C2D (possibly, C=D), let
(C,D)=|{τM2 (w) :w∈W2 a link, C2w∧w2D}|.
The value is plainly ﬁnite, because B
 is ﬁnite. It is the number of types of links in the interval
(C,D) of M2.
Corollary 6.19
Let C,D⊆M2 be 2-clusters with C2D. Then (C,D)>0.
Proof. By Lemma 6.16, there is a link w∈C. Plainly, C2w2D. So τ (w) contributes one to the
total for (C,D), which is therefore non-zero. 
Suppose that (C,D) is a pair of adjacent 2-clusters in M2. Using Lemma 6.16, take links c∈C
and d∈D. Imagine that (C,D)=1. As τ (c) and τ (d) both contribute one to (C,D), we must have
τ (c)=τ (d), and it follows that c≡M2B
 d. We have found similar points in C,D, as required for a

-linked model. This suggests trying to ﬁnd similar points in more general situations by induction
on (C,D), and that is what we will do in Lemma 6.22. For the induction step, we will need the
following important technical lemma. Part 3 of the lemma shows that the value of  drops, facilitating
the induction.
Lemma 6.20
Let C be a 2-cluster in M2, and let w∈M2 with C2w and w /∈C. Then there is a 2-irreﬂexive
u∈M2 such that:
(1) C2 u2w,
(2) there are c∈C and d∈λ(u) with c≡M2B
 d, and
(3) if w is 2-irreﬂexive and u2w, then (ρ(u),λ(w))<(C,λ(w)).
(See Lemma 5.5 for λ,ρ.) The mirror image also holds.
Proof. By Lemma 6.16, there is a link c∈C. Let B=τ (c). By Lemma 6.17, there is ∈c with
βB∈.
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Now pick any ∈w. Since C2w /∈C, by Lemma 6.6 we have 1 and ¬(1). By the
latter, there is a formula γ with
γ ∈ and G¬γ ∈. (7)
If w is 2-irreﬂexive, then  is 1-irreﬂexive, and in that case, as the reader may conﬁrm, we can
suppose that Hγ ∈ as well.
So γ ∧βB∈ and G¬(γ ∧βB)∈. As  is in a 1-cluster (⋃C), we have 1 {,}, so
F(γ ∧βB)∧FG¬(γ ∧βB)∈. Now by Corollary 3.5, the Prior axiom is provable, so its instance-
consequent F(G¬(γ ∧βB)∧HF(γ ∧βB)) is in . This lets us take 1 in M1 with
G¬(γ ∧βB)∧HF(γ ∧βB)∈. (8)
It follows from (8) that  is 1-irreﬂexive. Let u=/∼. By Lemma 6.6, u is 2-irreﬂexive.
Since 1, we have C2 u. (So by Lemma 5.5, C2λ(u); note that C=λ(u) is possible.) Since
HFγ ∈ but G¬γ ∈, we see that  1. By prelinearity, 1, so u2w. This proves part 1
of the lemma.
It follows from (8) and Lemma 3.3 that(γ ∧βB)∈. So we may choose′ ∈R1() containing
γ ∧βB. There are two possibilities, the ﬁrst being the reason why we need to use βB rather than
just βB. If ′ =, choose arbitrary ∈R1() with 1 (there is such a  by the mirror image
of axiom 4d). By transitivity of R1 we have βB∈. Alternatively, if ′ =, then by (8) we
have ¬(1′), and prelinearity of 1 gives ′1. In that case let =′. Again we have
βB∈.
Let d=/∼. Then d∈λ(u). By Lemma 6.17, τ (d)=B=τ (c). By Lemma 6.14, c≡M2B
 d. This
proves part 2 of the lemma.
For part 3, suppose thatw is2-irreﬂexive and u2w, so thatρ(u)2λ(w) byLemma5.5 (possibly
ρ(u)=λ(w)). We have Hγ ∈ in this case, and by (8), G¬(γ ∧βB)∈. It follows that βB /∈′
for every ′ ∈W1 with 1′1. As /∼=u and /∼=w, by Lemmas 6.6 and 6.17 there is
no link v with τ (v)=B and u2 v2w—equivalently, with ρ(u)2 v2λ(w) (see Lemma 5.5). So
{τ (v) :v∈W2 a link, ρ(u)2 v2λ(w)}⊆{τ (v) :v∈W2 a link, C2 v2λ(w)}\{B}.
Since there certainly is a link v of type B with C2 v2λ(w)—for example, v=c—we see that
(ρ(u),λ(w))<(C,λ(w)). 
We remark that γ in (7) may be very complex and the instance of the Prior axiom used to obtain (8)
may not be valid in M2. That is why we work in M1.
Deﬁnition 6.21
Let M= (W ,,R,h) be a submodel of M2.
(1) We say that M is good if it is ﬁnite, R2-generated and every-cluster in M is a2-cluster in
M2.
(2) We say that M is perfect if it is good, and for every pair (C,D) of adjacent -clusters in M,
there are c∈C and d∈D with c≡M2B
 d.
Note that we use ≡M2B
 and not ≡MB
 here. We will convert to ≡MB
 in Section 6.4 but we will need
a little more machinery for that.
Lemma 6.22
Every good submodel of M2 extends to a perfect submodel of M2.
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Proof. Let us say that a defect in a good submodel M= (W ,,R,h) of M2 is a pair (C,D) of
adjacent -clusters in M such that there do not exist c∈C, d∈D with c≡M2B
 d. Again, we use M2
here, not M. Let
d(M)=
∑{
(C,D) : (C,D) a defect of M}.
Then d(M)≥0, and d(M) is ﬁnite because M is.
Now let M= (W ,,R,h) be an arbitrary good submodel of M2. Among all good submodels
M∗= (W∗,∗,R∗,h∗) with M⊆M∗⊆M2, choose one with d(M∗) as small as possible. We will
show that d(M∗)=0. Since by Corollary 6.19, (C,D)>0 for every defect (C,D), it follows that
M∗ has no defects and is therefore perfect.
Assume for contradiction that d(M∗)>0. Pick any defect (C,D) inM∗ and any w∈D. AsM∗⊆
M2, we have C2w and ¬(w2C). Let u∈M2 be as provided by Lemma 6.20, and let N be the
submodel of M2 consisting of M∗ together with R2(u). We let  denote 2 N . So
{v∈N :CvD}=C∪λ(u)∪{u}∪ρ(u)∪D, (9)
shown left to right in -order. (Possibly, λ(u)=C or ρ(u)=D or both.) Plainly, N is good and
M⊆N ⊆M2. So by choice of M∗ we have d(N )≥d(M∗).
Now outside the range C–D shown in (9), all defects and their -values are the same in M∗ and
N . (Remember that  is evaluated with respect to M2.) So let us consider the remaining potential
defects in N . From inspection of (9), these are (C,λ(u)) and (ρ(u),D). (Note that (λ(u),ρ(u)) is not
a defect since it is not a pair of adjacent clusters: u is -irreﬂexive and λ(u)uρ(u).)
The pair (C,λ(u)) is not a defect, because Lemma 6.20 provides that C and λ(u) contain ≡M2B
 -
equivalent points (possibly even C=λ(u)).
So because d(N )≥d(M∗), we see that (ρ(u),D) must be a defect in N and moreover that
(ρ(u),D)≥(C,D).
But since C2ρ(u), we have ρ(u)2 t2D⇒C2 t2D for all t∈W2, so every link type
contributing to (ρ(u),D) also contributes to (C,D). Hence, (ρ(u),D)≤(C,D). So in fact,
(ρ(u),D)=(C,D) and d(N )=d(M∗).
Now u is irreﬂexive, so u2D and ¬(D2 u). Applying the mirror image of Lemma 6.20, we
obtain irreﬂexive v∈M2 with u2 v2D, where ρ(v) and D contain ≡M2B
 -equivalent points. But
ρ(u) and D do not contain ≡M2B
 -equivalent points, since (ρ(u),D) is a defect in N . It follows that
u =v. We conclude that u2 v2D.
LetN ′ be the submodel ofM2 consisting ofN together with R2(v). We let denote2 N ′. So
{v∈N ′ :ρ(u)vD}=ρ(u)∪λ(v)∪{v}∪ρ(v)∪D, (10)
again shown left to right in -order. (Possibly, ρ(u)=λ(v) or ρ(v)=D or both.) Outside the range
ρ(u)–D shown in (10), N ′ has the same defects as N . Within this range, the possible defects in
N ′ are (ρ(u),λ(v)) and (ρ(v),D). Lemma 6.20 provides that (ρ(v),D) is not a defect in N ′ and
that (ρ(u),λ(v))<(ρ(u),D). It follows that d(N ′)<d(N )=d(M∗). Since again, N ′ is good and
M⊆N ′ ⊆M2, this contradicts the minimality of d(M∗), and completes the proof. 
6.4 Models M3 and M4
Our ﬁnal model M4 will be a perfect submodel of M2 obtained by Lemma 6.22 from a good
submodel M3 satisfying ϕ0 that we have to construct ﬁrst. So we do a selective ﬁltration of M2
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1094 Priorean temporal logic
to deliver our ﬁrst veriﬁably ﬁnite model: an R2-generated submodel M3 of M2 satisfying ϕ0. We
select the points of M2 to include in M3 in three steps.
(1) Select the whole of C∞/∼ and C−∞/∼, which by Lemma 6.10 are ﬁnite 2-clusters and
R2-generated subsets of W2, and add them to M3.
(2) Now consider in turn each ψ ∈
 (if any) such that F¬ψ∧FGψ is satisﬁed in M2. Here,

 is as in Theorem 6.1. Choose any w∈W2 with M2,w |=F¬ψ∧FGψ . By Lemma 6.8,
M2,w |=F(Gψ∧HF¬ψ), so choose u∈W2 with M2,u |=Gψ∧HF¬ψ (and with u2w).
Select the whole ﬁnite set R2(u) and add it to M3.
(3) Also do the mirror image of step 2.
Clearly, M3 is a non-empty good submodel of M2. So by Lemma 6.22, we may choose a perfect
model M4 with M3⊆M4⊆M2. We have arrived at our ﬁnal model. We show ﬁrst that truth of
formulas in 
 is preserved between it and M2.
Lemma 6.23
For every w∈W4 and ψ ∈
 we have M4,w |=ψ iff M2,w |=ψ .
Proof. The proof is by induction on ψ . The argument is fairly standard for selective ﬁltration. If
ψ is atomic, it is true because M4 is a submodel of M2, and the boolean cases are straightforward
(note here and below that 
 is closed under subformulas, so the inductive hypothesis applies to
subformulas of ψ). The case ψ is also straightforward, because M4 is an R2-generated submodel
ofM2. The main cases are formulas in 
 of the form Gψ and Hψ . Then ψ ∈
; inductively assume
the result for ψ .
If M2,w |=Gψ , take arbitrary u4w in M4. Then u2w because M4⊆M2. So M2,u |=ψ .
Inductively, M4,u |=ψ . Since u was arbitrary, M4,w |=Gψ .
Assume now thatM2,w |=¬Gψ — i.e.,M2,w |=F¬ψ . It sufﬁces to ﬁnd v∈W3 with w2 v and
M2,v |=¬ψ . For then, we have v∈W4 (since W3⊆W4), w4 v (sinceM4⊆M2), andM4,v |=¬ψ
(by the inductive hypothesis). So v is a witness to M4,w |=¬Gψ .
There are two cases. The ﬁrst is when M2,w |=GF¬ψ . By Lemma 6.10, for every u∈C∞/∼ we
have u2w, so M2,u |=F¬ψ and there is v∈W2 with v2 u and M2,v |=¬ψ . By Lemma 6.10,
v∈C∞/∼ as well. So by construction, v∈W3, and by transitivity, w2 v as required.
The second case iswhenM2,w |=F¬ψ∧FGψ . By deﬁnition ofM3, there is u∈W2 withM2,u |=
Gψ∧HF¬ψ andR2(u)⊆W3. Ifw2 u thenM2,w |=Gψ , a contradiction. So by prelinearity,w2 u.
By Lemma 3.3, Gψ∧HF¬ψ→¬ψ is provable in the system without using the connectedness
axiom (or its mirror image). Since all axioms required for the proof are valid in the frame ofM2, and
the inference rules preserve frame validity, we see that Gψ∧HF¬ψ→¬ψ is valid in M2 and so
M2,u |=¬ψ . Choose v∈R2(u) withM2,v |=¬ψ . Then v∈W3 (since R2(u)⊆W3).As w2 uR2 v,
by axiom 4b we have w2 v, as required.
So in either case,M4,w |=¬Gψ as required. The case of Hψ is handled similarly. This completes
the induction. 
Our ﬁnal lemma establishes the main Theorem 6.1:
Lemma 6.24
The model M4 is 
-linked, and ϕ0 is satisﬁed in M4.
Proof. We refer to Deﬁnition 5.4 for the meaning of ‘
-linked’. Plainly, W4 is ﬁnite. We check that
the frame (W4,4,R4) ofM4 validates all axiomsof Section 3.1 excluding the connectedness axiom5
and itsmirror image.All these axioms are valid in the frame ofM2, so their ﬁrst-order correspondents
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are true in this frame. The correspondents of all axioms except temporal density and axiom 4d are
universal ﬁrst-order sentences, and so remain true in the frame of M4 which is a substructure of the
frame ofM2. The correspondent of axiom 4d is preserved by R-generated subframes and so remains
true in the frame of M4. The frame of M4 consists of4-clusters sometimes interspersed by single
irreﬂexive points. It is plain from this that 4 is dense, so the density axiom is valid in the frame.
Since M4⊆M2, and 2 is prelinear (by Lemma 6.9), 4 is prelinear too.
Let C⊆W4 be a 4-cluster. Since M4 is good, C is also a 2-cluster of M2. By Lemma 6.12,
the frame (C,R2 C) is connected. But this frame is (C,R4 C), since M4⊆M2. So (C,R4 C) is
connected.
As M4 is perfect, for every pair (C,D) of adjacent 4-clusters there are c∈C and d∈D with
c≡M2B
 d. By Lemma 6.23, c≡M4B
 d as well. So M4 is 
-linked.
ByLemma6.7,ϕ0 is satisﬁed inM2. Pick anyw∈C∞/∼.ThenM2,w |=Pϕ0.Recall thatPϕ0∈
.
Then w∈W4 and by Lemma 6.23, M4,w |=Pϕ0. It follows that ϕ0 is satisﬁed in M4. 
7 From linked models to real models
In Sections 7.1–7.3 we provide a simple way to build maps deﬁned on intervals of R. As far as
we know, the method essentially originates in [4]. We will use it in Section 7.4 to ‘represent’ any
connected S4-frame over R, and in Section 7.5 to ‘represent’ any 
-linked Kripke model over R in
a way that respects the formulas in 
. An example of the construction for the formula θ of (3) will
be given in Section 7.6.
Linear orders, intervals, and other related notions were introduced in Section 2.5. In particular,
recall that we often write a linear order (I,<) simply as I . In this section, we will write ordered pairs
in the form 〈i,j〉 where they might be confused with intervals.
7.1 Lexicographic sums of linear orders
Let (J,<) be a linear order, and for each j∈J let Ij be an interval of R. (More generally, Ij can be
any linear order, but we are concerned only with the case of intervals of R.) We write
I=
∑
j∈J
Ij ={〈i,j〉 : j∈J, i∈ Ij},
and deﬁne an order < on I lexicographically by 〈i,j〉< 〈i′,j′〉 iff j< j′ or (j= j′ and i< i′). Clearly,
(I,<) is a linear order. It can be thought of as the linear order obtained from (J,<) by replacing
each j∈J by a copy of Ij. If (J,<)= ({0,1,...,n},<) for some n∈N, we can write I explicitly as
I0+···+In. It can be thought of as a copy of I0 followed by copies of I1,...,In in order.
When J={0,1}, it is plain that if I0 has a greatest element and I1 has no least element, or if I0 has
no greatest element and I1 has a least element, then I0+I1 is order-isomorphic to an interval of R.
For example, (0,1]+(0,1]∼= (0,1)+[0,1]∼= (0,1]. More generally:
Proposition 7.1
Suppose that one of the following holds.
(1) J is ﬁnite, say (J,<)= ({0,1,...,n},<) for some n∈N. I0 has no least or greatest element. Each
Ij for j>0 has a least element but no greatest element.
(2) (J,<)= (Z,<), each Ij ( j odd) has no least or greatest element, and each Ij ( j even) is a
singleton.
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(3) (J,<)= (R,<), each Ij has a least and a greatest element, and Ij is a singleton for every
irrational j.
Then (∑j∈J Ij,<)∼= (R,<).
Proof (sketch). Alinear order is isomorphic to (R,<) iff it is dense, has no endpoints, has a countable
dense subset, and is Dedekind complete. It is well known and easy to check that each of the three
sum-orders above has these properties. See [4, 27] for more information. 
When J and the Ij meet one of the conditions in Proposition 7.1, the linear order (I,<) is isomorphic
to (R,<), and we will generally identify the two. Sometimes we will identify (I,<) with an open
interval of R. It will always be stated explicitly when these identiﬁcations are made.
7.2 Functions on linear orders
We continue to let (J,<) be a linear order, Ij (j∈J) an interval of R, and I=∑j∈J Ij. Let W be a
non-empty set, and for each j∈J let fj : Ij →W be a map. We deﬁne a map
f =
∑
j∈J
fj : I→W
by f (〈i,j〉) = fj(i).
In the case where (J,<)= ({0,1,...,n},<), we may write the sum explicitly as f0+···+fn. If Ij is a
singleton {x} and fj(x)=s, say, we may write the map fj simply as s.
This ‘sum’ notation for functions should not be confused with (for example) the pointwise sum of
real-valued functions, and in fact, in our applications the set W will be the set of worlds of a Kripke
frame and will have no ‘+’ operation deﬁned on it.
Example 7.2
If w0,...,wn∈W then, modulo a renaming of the elements of its domain, w0+···+wn is the map
f : {0,...,n}→W given by f (i)=wi for each i≤n.
For j∈J we deﬁne domf (fj)= Ij×{j}⊆ I . We will sometimes regard fj as a map fj :domf (fj)→W ,
via 〈i,j〉 → fj(i) for each 〈i,j〉∈domf (fj). In effect, we identify fj with f domf (fj).
The notation domf (fj) is more convenient than the plain Ij×{j} for two reasons. First, in several
placeswewill not have explicit notation for the Ij, and the notation saves us from the need to introduce
any. Second, we will frequently be identifying I with R via some tacit order isomorphism ρ : I→R,
and we will carry over the notation domf (fj) via the identiﬁcation. Formally, when this identiﬁcation
is in operation,
(1) we will identify f with the map f ◦ρ−1 :R→W ,
(2) we will redeﬁne domf (fj) to denote the interval ρ(Ij×{j}) of R, and
(3) we will sometimes identify fj with the map f ◦ρ−1 ρ(Ij×{j}) deﬁned on this interval.
7.3 Shufﬂes
There is an important special case known as the shufﬂe. Reynolds [26] described a shufﬂe as a
‘thoroughmixture’of its ingredients. KeepingW as above, letG be a countable (possibly empty) set of
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maps of the form g :Kg→W , whereKg is an interval of R with a least and a greatest element. Suppose
also that g0 :Kg0 →W is a map, where Kg0 is a singleton interval of R. Choose any θ :R→G∪{g0}
such that θ (j)=g0 for every irrational j, and θ−1(g) is a dense subset of Q for each g∈G. This is not
difﬁcult to do. Then θ−1(g) is dense in R for every g∈G∪{g0}. Now deﬁne Ij =Kθ (j) for each j∈R,
so that θ(j) : Ij →W , and let
I=
∑
j∈R
Ij, σ =
∑
j∈R
θ(j) : I→W .
Then σ (〈i,j〉)= (θ (j))(i)∈W .
An element x∈ I is said to be a σ -endpoint if it is of the form 〈i,j〉, where j∈R and i is the least
or greatest element of Ij.
Lemma 7.3
Let I,σ be as above, let x,y,z∈ I with y<x<z, and suppose that x is a σ -endpoint. Then σ ((y,z))=
rng(σ ).
Proof. We show that rngσ ⊆σ ((y,z)) (the converse inclusion is trivial). Fix arbitrary s∈ rngσ . Pick
g∈G∪{g0} and k∈Kg with g(k)=s. Suppose x=〈i,j〉, say, and suppose that i is the least element
of Ij (the case where it is the greatest element of Ij is similar). If y=〈i′,j′〉, say, then we must have
j′< j. Now θ−1(g) is dense in R, so we may pick j∗ ∈θ−1(g) with j′< j∗< j. Then y< 〈k,j∗〉<z and
s=σ (〈k,j∗〉)∈σ ((y,z)) as required. 
Corollary 7.4
Let I,σ be as above. Then σ−1(s) is unbounded in I for each s∈ rng(σ ).
Proof. This follows from the lemma, as the set of σ -endpoints is unbounded in I . 
By Proposition 7.1(3), the linear order (I,<) is isomorphic to (R,<), so by choosing a suitable
isomorphism we can regard σ as a map σ :R→W . This map depends on the choices of the
isomorphism and θ , but any choices will do for us and in fact all choices lead to the same result
modulo an automorphism (order-preserving permutation) of (R,<). So we let
Shufﬂe
(G ; g0)
denote a map σ :R→W as above, for arbitrary tacit choices of these items. The elements of G∪{g0}
are called the ingredients of the shufﬂe.
Example 7.5
If a,b,c∈W then Shufﬂe({a,b};c) can be taken to be a map σ :R→{a,b,c} such that σ−1(a), σ−1(b)
are dense sets of rationals and σ−1(c)=R\Q.
7.4 S4 frames
We now use lexicographic sums to establish a relative of the McKinsey–Tarski theorem that the
logic of R in the language with  is S4 [20]. It will be needed in Section 7.5. A similar method is
used in [10] to prove the McKinsey–Tarski theorem itself, and others. There is also very substantial
similarity to the methods used in [20, 24].
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Deﬁnition 7.6
An S4-frame is a pair (W ,R), where R is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation on the non-empty
set W .
Deﬁnition 7.7
Let F= (W ,R) be an S4-frame, (I,<) a linear order, and g : I→W a map. We say that an element
x∈ I is g-fair (with respect to F) if there are y,z∈ I with y<x<z and such that g((y′,z′))=R(g(x))
for every y′,z′ ∈ I with y≤y′<x<z′ ≤z.
To motivate the deﬁnition, consider a Kripke model M= (W ,R,h) and a map g :R→W . Let
h′ :PV →℘(R) be the assignment induced fromM by g, via h′(p)=g−1(h(p)) for p∈PV . The reader
is invited to check that if every x∈R is g-fair then g preserves all modal formulas: (R,h′),x |=ϕ iff
M,g(x) |=ϕ for every x∈R and every L-formula ϕ not involving G or H. See the claim in the proof
of Lemma 7.25.
Remark 7.8
Clearly, if F is an R-generated subframe of an S4-frame G, a point x∈ I is g-fair with respect to F
iff it is g-fair with respect to G.
Where the meaning is clear from the context, we will usually say simply that x is g-fair.
Remark 7.9
Fairness is clearly a ‘local’ property depending only on arbitrarily small neighbourhoods of the point
in question. So if g=∑j∈J fj, j∈J , and x∈domg(fj) is in the interior of domg(fj) (that is, x is not a
least or greatest element of domg(fj)), then x is g-fair iff it is fj-fair. (Recall here that we identify fj
with gdomg(fj).)
Theorem 7.10
Let F= (W ,R) be a ﬁnite connected S4-frame (connected frames were deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.2).
Then there is a map g :R→W satisfying:
(1) every x∈R is g-fair (with respect to F),
(2) g−1(w) is unbounded in R for every w∈W .
Proof. Recall from deﬁnition 2.1 that R•wu means that Rwu∧¬Ruw. As F is ﬁnite, we can deﬁne
for each w∈W a map νw :R→W by complete induction on |R(w)|:
νw=Shufﬂe
({w+νu+w :u∈R•(w)}∪{u :Rwu∧Ruw} ;w).
This is well deﬁned because (a) for each u∈R•(w), since R is transitive we have R(u)⊆R(w), and
plainly w∈R(w)\R(u), so |R(u)|< |R(w)| and hence νu is deﬁned inductively, (b) the domain of each
map w+νu+w and of each map u can be taken to be an interval of R with a least and a greatest point
(for u it is a singleton interval), and (c) the domain of the map w is some singleton interval of R.
Claim. For each w∈W :
(1) rng(νw)=R(w).
(2) Every x∈R is νw-fair.
Proof of claim. The proof is by complete induction on |R(w)|. Inductively assume the claim for
all u∈R•(w). For part 1, rng(νw) is clearly the union of the ranges of the ingredients of the shufﬂe
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deﬁning νw. For any u∈W , the range of the map u is just {u}. So using the inductive hypothesis,
rng(νw) =
(⋃
u∈R•(w)({w}∪rng(νu)∪{w})
)∪{u :Rwu∧Ruw}∪{w}
= (⋃u∈R•(w)R(u))∪{u :Rwu∧Ruw}∪{w}
= R(w).
This proves part 1. For part 2, take x∈R. We show that x is νw-fair. If x is a νw-endpoint (see
Section 7.3), suppose that νw(x)=u, say. The deﬁnition of νw tells us that either u=w, or Rwu and
Ruw. In both cases, by transitivity of R we have R(u)=R(w). By Lemma 7.3 and part 1, whenever
y<x<z we have
νw((y,z))= rng(νw)=R(w)=R(u).
It follows that x is νw-fair. If x is not a νw-endpoint, then x is in the interior of the domain of νu for
some u∈R•(w). Inductively, x is νu-fair, and hence (see Remark 7.9) it is νw-fair as well. This proves
the claim.
Now F is connected and R is reﬂexive and transitive. It follows that F is path-connected in
the sense that for each u,v∈W there are w0,...,wn∈W (for some ﬁnite n) with w0=u, wn=v,
R(wi,wi+1) for each even i<n, and R(wi+1,wi) for each odd i<n. Using this and the ﬁniteness of
F , it is straightforward to ﬁnd an inﬁnite zigzag path throughF that visits each point inﬁnitely often.
Formally, there are ai,bi∈W (i∈Z) satisfying:
• Raibi−1 and Raibi for each i∈Z,
• for each w∈W , the set {i∈Z :ai=w} is unbounded in Z.
We would like to deﬁne g=∑i∈Z(ai+νai +ai+νbi ), but the notation may be easier to follow if we
avoid nested sums. So for each i∈Z, deﬁne functions as follows:
f4i = f4i+2 = ai,
f4i+1 = νai ,
f4i+3 = νbi .
We now deﬁne our desired map g :R→W by
g=
∑
j∈Z
fj.
By Proposition 7.1(2), dom(g) is order-isomorphic to R. As usual, we identify the two, and identify
each restriction gdomg(fj) of g with fj.
Let x∈R be arbitrary.We show that it is g-fair. Fix the unique j∈Z such that x∈domg(fj). There are
four cases. If j=4i+1 for some i∈Z, then fj =νai . By the claim, x is νai -fair, and hence (Remark 7.9)
it is g-fair. The case where j=4i+3 for some i∈Z is similar.
Suppose j=4i+2 for some i∈Z. So fj is themap ai, g(x)=ai, and themaps fj−1=νai and fj+1=νbi
are shufﬂes. Take any y∈domg(fj−1) and z∈domg(fj+1), so that y<x<z. By applying Corollary 7.4
and part 1 of the claim to νai and νbi , we see that
g((y,x))= rng(νai )=R(ai),
g((x,z))= rng(νbi )=R(bi).
Consequently, g((y,z))=g((y,x))∪{g(x)}∪g((x,z))=R(ai)∪{ai}∪R(bi). But ai∈R(ai), and more-
over, since Raibi, transitivity yields R(bi)⊆R(ai). So this union is just R(ai)—i.e. R(g(x)).
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Thus, g((y,z))=R(g(x)) for every y∈domg(fj−1) and z∈domg(fj+1). Since all sufﬁciently large
y<x lie in domg(fj−1) and all sufﬁciently small z>x lie in domg(fj+1), it follows that x is g-fair as
required.
A similar argument covers the case where j=4i for some i∈Z. We simply note that the left and
right neighbours of x are then νbi−1 and νai , respectively, and that Raibi−1. So in all cases, x is g-fair.
This proves part 1 of the theorem.
For part 2, let w∈W and r∈R be given. The set {i∈Z :ai=w} is unbounded in Z, so we can take
i,j∈Z such that ai=w, j=4i (so fj =ai), and so large that r<x for the unique x∈domg(fj). Then
g(x)=ai=w. So g−1(w) has no upper bound, and a symmetrical argument shows that it has no lower
bound either. 
7.5 Representing 
-linked models
Here, we prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 7.11
Let
 be a ﬁnite set ofL-formulas closed under subformulas, let ϕ∈
, and suppose that ϕ is satisﬁed
in some 
-linked Kripke model. Then ϕ is satisﬁable over R.
To prove it, ﬁx ϕ,
 as in the statement of the theorem, and let M= (W ,,R,h) be a 
-linked
Kripke model in which ϕ is satisﬁed. We will use Theorem 7.10 to deﬁne (in Deﬁnition 7.18) a map
g :R→W that will induce a model over R, and we will then prove that g preserves all formulas in 
.
The theorem will follow from this.
To deﬁne g, we need to set out some terminology.
7.5.1 Clusters in the model
Since M is 
-linked (see Deﬁnition 5.4),  is prelinear and Lemma 5.5 applies to the frame of M.
Thus we may enumerate, without repetitions, the-clusters in M as C0,...,Ck for some k≥0, with
C0C1 ···Ck .
Let i<k. Then (Ci,Ci+1) is a pair of consecutive -clusters. As M is 
-linked, there are two
possibilities.
(1) Ci and Ci+1 are not adjacent, so there is u∈M with CiuCi+1 and u /∈Ci∪Ci+1. Then u is
not in any -cluster, so is irreﬂexive. We must have Ci=λ(u) and Ci+1=ρ(u). It follows that
u is unique. We deﬁne ui to be this u, and we say that i is open, Ci is right-open, and Ci+1 is
left-open.
(2) Ci and Ci+1 are adjacent, so as M is 
-linked, we can select di∈Ci and si+1∈Ci+1 with
di≡MB
 si+1. In this case, we say that i is closed, Ci is right-closed, and Ci+1 is left-closed.
We also say thatC0 is left-open andCk right-open. (We do not deﬁne k itself as either open or closed.)
7.5.2 The maps fi and f ′i
The map g :R→W will be made from maps f0,...,fk and f ′0,...,f ′k−1. Up to an order automorphism of
R, we will have g=∑i<k(fi+f ′i )+fk , but it may help the reader if we provide more speciﬁc notation
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for the domains of the components of this sum. So we choose elements
−∞= l0<r0≤ l1<r1≤ l2<r2≤···<rk−1≤ lk <rk =∞ (11)
in R∪{±∞}, such that ri= li+1 iff i is open, for each i<k. We will use these elements to deﬁne
• surjective maps fi : (li,ri)→Ci for each i≤k,
• ‘ﬁller’ maps f ′i : [ri,li+1]→W for each i<k.
Unfortunately, the deﬁnitions involve a number of cases, because the Ci come in four kinds: left- or
right-open, and left- or right-closed.
Deﬁnition 7.12
First we deﬁne the maps fi for i≤k. Fix such an i. We will actually deﬁne fi by way of an auxiliary
map, f ∗i . First note that because M is 
-linked, (Ci,RCi) is a ﬁnite connected S4-frame.
(1) If Ci is left-open and right-open then, observing that (li,ri) is order-isomorphic to R, use
Theorem 7.10 to choose a map f ∗i : (li,ri)→Ci satisfying the stated properties—to wit, every
x∈ (li,ri) is f ∗i -fair with respect to (Ci,RCi), and (f ∗i )−1(w) is unbounded in (li,ri) for every
w∈Ci.
(2) If Ci is left-open and right-closed, ﬁrst use Theorem 7.10 to choose a map f ∗i : (li,∞)→Ci with
the stated properties. The properties ensure that there is x> li with f ∗i (x)=di. By some scaling,
we can suppose that x=ri.
(3) If Ci is left-closed and right-open, we use a mirror image argument to choose a map f ∗i :
(−∞,ri)→Ci with f ∗i (li)=si.
(4) IfCi is left-closed and right-closed, we combine the preceding two cases, with a little extra work
to ensure surjectivity. Using Theorem 7.10, choose a map f ∗i :R→Ci with the stated properties.
By the properties and the ﬁniteness of Ci, there are x<y in R with f ∗i (x)=si, f ∗i (y)=di, andf ∗i ((x,y))=Ci. By scaling, we can assume that x= li and y=ri.
We now deﬁne fi= f ∗i  (li,ri).
Before moving on, we collect some facts about the fi.
Lemma 7.13
Let i≤k and x∈ (li,ri). If Ci is left-open then fi((li,x))=Ci. If Ci is right-open then fi((x,ri))=Ci.
Proof. Suppose that Ci is left-open. Certainly, fi((li,x))⊆ rng(f ∗i )=Ci. To prove the converse
inclusion, let w∈Ci be given. Because Ci is left-open, dom(f ∗i ) has the form (li,z) where either
z=ri or z=∞ (see Deﬁnition 7.12(1,2)). By Theorem 7.10, (f ∗i )−1(w) is unbounded in dom(f ∗i ), so
there is y∈ (li,x) with f ∗i (y)=w. By deﬁnition, fi= f ∗i  (li,ri), so fi(y)=w and hence w∈ fi((li,x)).
Since w was arbitrary, Ci⊆ fi((li,x)), proving the ﬁrst part. The second part is a mirror image. 
Corollary 7.14
For each i≤k, the map fi : (li,ri)→Ci is surjective.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 7.13 except when Ci is left-closed and right-closed (case 4
of Deﬁnition 7.12). But in that case, we arranged explicitly that fi((li,ri))=Ci. 
Lemma 7.15
Suppose that i<k is closed. Then fi((y,ri))⊆R(di) for some y∈ (li,ri), and fi+1((li+1,z))⊆R(si+1)
for some z∈ (li+1,ri+1).
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Proof. Here, Ci is right-closed, Ci+1 is left-closed, and di,si+1 are deﬁned. By Theorem 7.10,
ri is f ∗i -fair, so there are y,z∈dom(f ∗i ) with li<y<ri<z and f ∗i ((y,z))=R(f ∗i (ri))=R(di). Thenfi((y,ri))= f ∗i ((y,ri))⊆ f ∗i ((y,z))=R(di). This proves the ﬁrst part of the lemma, and the second part
is a mirror image. 
Deﬁnition 7.16
Next we deﬁne the maps f ′i : [ri,li+1]→W for each i<k.
(1) If i is open, then ri= li+1 and ui is deﬁned. Deﬁne f ′i simply by f ′i (ri)=ui.
(2) If i is closed, then Ci is right-closed, Ci+1 is left-closed, and di,si+1 are deﬁned. Plainly,
(R(di),RR(di)) is a ﬁnite S4-frame. It is trivially connected, because if R(di) is the union of
disjoint R-generated subsets X,Y , then supposing without loss of generality that di∈X, we
have R(di)⊆X and so Y =∅. Noting that (ri,li+1) is order-isomorphic to R in this case, we
may therefore choose a map f ′i : (ri,li+1)→R(di) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 7.10—to
wit, each x∈ (ri,li+1) is f ′i -fair with respect to (R(di),RR(di)), and f ′i −1(w) is unbounded in
(ri,li+1) for each w∈R(di). We extend f ′i to the whole of [ri,li+1] by deﬁning f ′i (ri)=di andf ′i (li+1)=si+1. (So in this case, f ′i ([ri,li+1))⊆Ci but f ′i (li+1)∈Ci+1.)
Lemma 7.17
Suppose that i<k is closed and let x∈ (ri,li+1). Then f ′i ((ri,x))= f ′i ((x,li+1))=R(di).
Proof. As in Lemma 7.13, Theorem 7.10’s conditions imply that (ri,li+1)∩f ′i −1(w) is unbounded
in (ri,li+1) for each w∈R(di), from which the lemma follows. 
7.5.3 The map g
Deﬁnition 7.18
We ﬁnally deﬁne g= (⋃i≤k fi)∪(⋃i<k f ′i ) :R→W . That is, for each x∈R,
g(x)=
{
fi(x), if x∈ (li,ri) for some i≤k,
f ′i (x), if x∈[ri,li+1] for some i<k.
This is plainly well deﬁned.
Example 7.19
An example of the construction of g is shown in Figure 2. In the ﬁgure, C0 and C4 are left- and
right-open, C1 is left-open and right-closed, C2 is left- and right-closed, and C3 is left-closed and
right-open. The small circles inside C1 and C2 are d1 and s2, respectively, and the big circles are
R(d1) and R(s2), respectively. Similarly, the element d2 is the small square inside C2, and the large
square is R(d2). The large square inside C3 is R(s3) and s3 is the small square inside it. We can
see that R(d1) is used in a sense as intervening material for g between C1 and C2 via f ′1, and
similarly with R(d2). For an example of how the construction produces a model of ϕ over R, see
Section 7.6.
7.5.4 Properties of g
We establish a few properties of g, useful below.
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Figure 2. Example of parts of g :R→M when k=4.
Lemma 7.20
For each i≤k,
Yi={x∈R :g(x)Ci}=
{
(−∞,li+1), if i<k,
R, if i=k.
Proof. If i=k, the result is trivial since WCk . Let i<k. If x< li+1, then g(x) is fj(x) or f ′j (x) for
some j≤ i, so by inspection, g(x)∈Cj for some j≤ i, or g(x)=uj for some j< i (we have j = i since
x = li+1). It follows that g(x)Ci. If x≥ li+1 then g(x)=uj for some j≥ i or g(x)∈Cj for some j> i,
so ¬(g(x)Ci). 
Lemma 7.21
The map g :R→W is surjective and order preserving: if x<y in R then g(x)g(y).
Proof. Surjectivity is immediate from Corollary 7.14 and the fact that g(ri)=ui for every i<k such
that ui is deﬁned. We check that g is order preserving. Assume x<y. Suppose ﬁrst that g(y)∈Ci for
some i≤k. Then y∈Yi. By Lemma 7.20, Yi is closed downwards under <, so x∈Yi as well. Hence
g(y)∈Cig(x) as required. If on the other hand g(y)=ui for some i<k, then the deﬁnition of g
yields y= li+1>x, so x∈Yi by Lemma 7.20. Hence g(x)Ciui=g(y) as required. 
Lemma 7.22
Each x∈R\{ri,li+1 : i<k} is g-fair with respect to the frame of M.
Proof. Each such x is in the interior of dom(fi) for some i≤k or the interior of dom( f ′i ) for
some i<k. As fi and f ′i were deﬁned using Theorem 7.10, in the former case x is fi-fair with
respect to (Ci,RCi), and in the latter case x is f ′i -fair with respect to (R(di),RR(di)). These are
R-generated subframes of the frame of M. By Remarks 7.8 and 7.9, x is g-fair with respect to the
frame of M. 
Lemma 7.23
Let i≤k and x∈ (li,ri).
(1) If Ci is left-open then g((li,x))=Ci.
(2) If Ci is right-open then g((x,ri))=Ci.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 7.13, since g (li,ri)= fi. 
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Lemma 7.24
Suppose that i<k is closed.
(1) g((y,ri))⊆R(di) for some y<ri.
(2) g((ri,x))=g((x,li+1))=R(di) for every x∈ (ri,li+1).
(3) g((li+1,z))⊆R(si+1) for some z> li+1.
Proof. Since g (li,ri)= fi and g (li+1,ri+1)= fi+1, parts 1 and 3 follow from Lemma 7.15. Part 2
follows from Lemma 7.17, since g (ri,li+1)= f ′i . 
7.5.5 The model R
We deﬁne an assignment h′ into R by h′(p)=g−1(h(p)), for each atom p. We let R= (R,h′). This
is our intended model. We now prove a ‘truth lemma’ for it, from which Theorem 7.11 will easily
follow.
Lemma 7.25
For every ψ ∈
 and x∈R we have R,x |=ψ iff M,g(x) |=ψ .
Proof. By induction on ψ . The lemma for atomic ψ is immediate from the deﬁnition of h′, and the
boolean cases are easy. The main cases are Gψ , Hψ , andψ . Since 
 is closed under subformulas,
ψ ∈
 as well, so inductively assume the lemma for ψ :
R,x |=ψ ⇐⇒M,g(x) |=ψ for every x∈R (inductive hypothesis) (12)
First we deal with the temporal operators. If M,g(x) |=Gψ then take arbitrary y∈R with y>x.
By Lemma 7.21, g is order preserving, so g(x)g(y) and henceM,g(y) |=ψ . Inductively,R,y |=ψ ,
and as y was arbitrary, R,x |=Gψ .
Conversely, suppose that M,g(x) |=¬Gψ . As W is ﬁnite and  transitive and prelinear, we may
choose w∈W such that M,w |=¬ψ and wu for all u∈W with M,u |=¬ψ . Such a w is a ‘-
maximal’ witness to ¬ψ in M. It should be plain that g(x)w. We show that
there is y>x in R with g(y)=w. (13)
To prove (13), there are two cases.
Case 1: w=ui for some i<k. We have g(x)w=ui, so g(x)λ(ui)=Ci. By Lemma 7.20, x∈Yi=
(−∞,li+1). So x< li+1, and by deﬁnition of g, g(li+1)=ui=w, proving (13) in this case.
Case 2: w∈Ci for some i≤k. We show ﬁrst that Ci is right-open. Suppose for contradiction that
Ci is right-closed. Then i<k, the points di and si+1 are deﬁned, and w and di are in the same
cluster, so diw and henceM,di |=¬Gψ . But di≡MB
 si+1 andGψ ∈B
, soM,si+1 |=¬Gψ
as well, and there is u∈W with si+1u and M,u |=¬ψ . By choice of w we have uw.
So si+1uwdi. By transitivity, si+1di. But this is a contradiction, because di∈Ci,
si+1∈Ci+1, and Ci+1 is a strictly -later cluster than Ci. So Ci is indeed right-open.
Because Ci is right-open, if i<k then ri= li+1. Also, rk =∞. So Lemma 7.20 yields
Yi={y∈R :g(y)Ci}= (−∞,ri). Since g(x)w∈Ci, we have x∈Yi. As Ci is right-open,
Lemma7.23(2) yieldsCi⊆g((x,ri)), so there is y>xwith g(y)=w, proving (13) in this case too.
So we may take y as in (13). Then R,y |=¬ψ by the inductive hypothesis (12), so R,x |=¬Gψ as
required.
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In spite of the temporal asymmetry of the deﬁnition of g, the case of Hψ is so similar that we leave
it to the reader.
Finally we consider ψ , the most interesting case. The following claim will make light of all but
one of the subsequent subcases.
Claim. If x is g-fair then R,x |=ψ iff M,g(x) |=ψ .
Proof of claim. Assume that x is g-fair. First suppose that M,g(x) |=ψ . By g-fairness of x, we
can choose y,z∈R with y<x<z and g((y,z))⊆R(g(x)). Take arbitrary t∈ (y,z). Then g(t)∈R(g(x)),
so by Kripke semantics,M,g(t) |=ψ . By the inductive hypothesis (12),R,t |=ψ . As t was arbitrary,
we obtain R,x |=ψ .
Conversely, if R,x |=ψ then choose y<x<z in R such that R,t |=ψ for all t∈ (y,z). Pick
arbitrary w∈R(g(x)). By g-fairness of x we have R(g(x))⊆g((y,z)), so there is t∈ (y,z) with g(t)=w.
Since t∈ (y,z), we have R,t |=ψ , and inductively (see (12)), M,w |=ψ . Since w was arbitrary,
M,g(x) |=ψ . This proves the claim.
There are now four subcases.
(1) If x∈R\{ri,li+1 : i<k} then by Lemma 7.22, x is g-fair, and the claim gives R,x |=ψ iff
M,g(x) |=ψ as required.
(2) Suppose that x= li+1=ri for some i<k. We show that x is g-fair, and this is easy to do.
As ri= li+1, we see that Ci is right-open, Ci+1 is left-open, and g(x)=ui. Take any y,z with
li<y<x<z<ri+1. Recalling that x= li+1=ri, by Lemma 7.23 we have g((y,x))=Ci and
g((x,z))=Ci+1, so
g((y,z))=g((y,x))∪{g(x)}∪g((x,z))=Ci∪{ui}∪Ci+1=R(ui).
Hence, x is g-fair. By the claim, R,x |=ψ iff M,g(x) |=ψ .
(3) Suppose that x=ri< li+1 for some i<k. Then i is closed and g(x)=di. By Lemma 7.24(1),
g((y,x))⊆R(di) for all large enough y<x. On the other side, if z∈ (x,li+1) then by
Lemma 7.24(2), g((x,z))=R(di). Consequently, for all large enough y and small enough z
with y<x<z, we have
g((y,z))=g((y,x))∪{g(x)}∪g((x,z))=
⊆R(di)︷ ︸︸ ︷
g((y,x))∪{di}∪R(di)=R(di).
So once again, x is g-fair, and the claim yields R,x |=ψ iff M,g(x) |=ψ .
(4) Finally suppose that ri< li+1=x for some i<k. This case is the culmination of our work. The
claim does not apply, as x is not g-fair: indeed, g((ri,x)) is disjoint from R(g(x)).
Since ri< li+1, we know that Ci is right-closed, Ci+1 is left-closed, di and si+1 are both
deﬁned, g(x)=si+1, and di≡MB
 si+1.
Suppose on the one hand that R,x |=ψ . We show ﬁrst that M,di |=ψ . Choose y∈ (ri,x)
with R,t |=ψ for all t∈ (y,x). Then g((y,x))=R(di) by Lemma 7.24(2). Let w∈R(di) be
arbitrary. Choose t∈ (y,x) with g(t)=w. Inductively (see (12)), M,w |=ψ . Since w was
arbitrary, we obtain M,di |=ψ as required. But di≡MB
 si+1=g(x) and ψ ∈B
, so we
have M,g(x) |=ψ as well.
Suppose on the other hand that M,g(x) |=ψ . As g(x)=si+1≡MB
 di and ψ ∈B
, we
have both M,si+1 |=ψ and M,di |=ψ . Hence, M,w |=ψ for every w∈R(si+1)∪R(di).
Let y=ri<x. It follows from Lemma 7.24(2) that g((y,x))=R(di). By Lemma 7.24(3) there is
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z>x such that g((x,z))⊆R(si+1). Of course, {g(x)}⊆R(si+1) too. So
g((y,z))=g((y,x))∪{g(x)}∪g((x,z))⊆R(di)∪R(si+1).
Choose t∈ (y,z) arbitrarily. By the above, g(t)∈R(di)∪R(si+1). So M,g(t) |=ψ , and
inductively (see (12)),R,t |=ψ aswell. Since t was arbitrary, we obtainR,x |=ψ , as required.
This completes the induction and the proof. 
Now choose w∈W with M,w |=ϕ. By Lemma 7.21, g is surjective, so there is x∈R with
g(x)=w. Since ϕ∈
, by the lemma we obtain R,x |=ϕ. Thus, ϕ is satisﬁable over R, proving
Theorem 7.11.
7.6 Example
We give a brief example of the construction of R. Recall from Proposition 5.6 that the formula
θ=H¬a∧H¬b∧¬a∧¬b∧a∧b∧G¬(a∧b)∧FG¬a
of (3) is true at world u0 in the 
-linked Kripke model M shown in Figure 3, where 
 is the set of
subformulas of θ .
Following the route taken in Section 7.5, we select points −∞= l0<r0= l1<r1< l2<r2= l3<
r3=∞ in R∪{±∞}. Theorem 7.10 yields maps f ∗i :R→Ci for i=0,1,2,3, which we scale and chop
to give maps fi : (li,ri)→Ci. For i =1 there is no choice for fi, since |Ci|=1. For f ∗1 :R→C1, the
sequence ai,bi (i∈Z) in the proof of Theorem 7.10 looks like
··· a−2 b−2 a−1 b−1 a0 b0 a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3 a4 b4 a5 b5 ···
··· a d1 d1 d1 b d1 d1 d1 a d1 d1 d1 b d1 d1 d1 ···
so f ∗1 is aZ-sumofmaps taking singletons to a,b,d1 and open intervals ofR to d1. Up to isomorphism,
it maps odd integers to the point satisfying a in C1, even integers to the point satisfying b, and non-
integers to d1. We choose a non-integer, say −0.5, and scale f ∗1  (−∞,−0.5) to (l1,r1), yielding
our map f1 : (l1,r1)→C1. The odd negative integers, when scaled, form a sequence of points in
(l1,r1) converging to l1 and mapping to a under f1, and there is a similar sequence for b arising from
the even negative integers. There is no choice over the maps f ′i , since by the deﬁnitions we havef ′0 : [r0,l1]→{u0}, f ′1 : [r1,l2)→R(d1)={d1}, f ′1(l2)=s2, and f ′2 : [r2,l3]→{u2}.
Figure 4 sketches these maps. We let g :R→M be the union of all of them. The model over R
induced by g is shown in Figure 5. It should be clear that θ is true at l1.
Figure 3. Kripke model M satisfying θ .
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Figure 4. The maps fi and f ′i (i=0,1,2) and f3.
Figure 5. The map g :R→M.
8 Conclusion
We can now prove our main result:
Theorem 8.1
The system of Section 3.1 axiomatises the L-logic of R.
Proof. Soundness was shown in Theorem 3.1. Conversely, let ϕ0 be a formula consistent with the
system of Section 3.1. Let 
 be the set of subformulas of Pϕ0. By Theorem 6.1, ϕ0 is satisﬁed in a

-linked Kripke model. By Theorem 7.11, ϕ0 is satisﬁable over R. Hence, any consistent formula
is satisﬁable over R. 
We have shown that the logic of R in the temporal language L with modalities G, H and 
• is ﬁnitely axiomatizable, answering an implicit problem of Shehtman [28],
• has PSPACE-complete complexity,
• has no strongly complete axiomatization, and
• is not Kripke complete.
We list some remaining open problems. First, some complexity problems.
Problem 8.2
For ﬁxed k≥0, what is the complexity of the set ofL-formulas that are satisﬁable over R and involve
at most k -operators?
Themethods of [23]may be helpful. If the answer is ‘NP-complete’, it might suggest that the language
with F, P and  could be more tractable in practice than the more expressive language with Until
and Since.
The operations of sum (+) and shufﬂe in Section 7, plus two more involving countable iterations,
can be used to specify models over R in a ﬁnite way. By results in [4], any model over R can
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be speciﬁed up to any desired degree of ﬁrst-order equivalence in such a way, so any satisﬁable
L-formula has a model speciﬁed by these operations. This leads to the following problem.
Problem 8.3
Investigate the complexity of model checking for the language L for models over R speciﬁed by a
ﬁnite sequence of operations of the above kinds.
This problem was investigated in [6] for the language with Until and Since. It was shown to be in
PSPACE in [19] and PSPACE-complete in [8]. One may also wish to develop alternative reasoning
systems for L over R, such as tableaux, and synthesis methods along the lines of [6, 7]. The end
result of this research could justify the promotion of L as a viable language for speciﬁcation and
reasoning over the real line, possibly a more attractive one than the very expressive language with
Until and Since.
Itmay be of interest to study the logic ofR in the sublanguage ofLwithoutH: the only non-Boolean
connectives are G and . This logic is PSPACE-complete, by the same argument as in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2 survives: there is no strongly complete axiomatization. The proof of Theorem 4.5 can
be adapted to show that it is not Kripke complete, using the formula
F(p∧G¬p∧¬a∧¬b∧a∧b∧G¬(a∧b)∧FG¬a)∧G(Fp→¬a∧¬b).
The Prior axiom is no longer expressible, but a variant Fp∧FG¬p→F(G¬p∧p) can be used
instead.
Problem 8.4 (N. Bezhanishvili)
Is the logic of R with connectives G, ﬁnitely axiomatizable?
An alternative and more expressive interpretation of is as ‘derivative’ [d], so that (R,h),x |=[d]ϕ
if there is an open neighbourhoodO of x with (R,h),y |=ϕ for every y∈O\{x}. Finite axiomatizations
of the logic ofRwith [d] alone (withoutG,H) andwith [d] and∀ are given in [18] (see alsoShehtman’s
habilitation thesis and [10]). Gatto [9] has recently shown that the logic of R in the language with G,
H, and [d] is ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
Other possible, non-ﬁrst-order deﬁnable interpretations of  over R are based on cardinality and
Baire category. For example, one could deﬁne (R,h),x |=ϕ to holdwhen every open neighbourhood
of x contains uncountably many points y with (R,h),y |=ϕ.
Problem 8.5
Study the logic of R (and, dropping G,H , of other topological spaces) in the language with boxes
based on cardinality or Baire category, plus G,H,,[d], and its sublanguages.
One ﬁnal language consists of G,H and two modalities +,−, where (R,h),x |=+ϕ if there is
y>x such that (R,h),z |=ϕ for every z∈ (x,y), and − is the mirror image. We could read − and
+ as ‘recently’ and ‘imminently’. The corresponding diamonds have been written in the literature
as K−,K+, respectively.
Problem 8.6
Find axiomatizations of the logic of R in this language and in sublanguages such as {G,+}.
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